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Shaping a global economy fit for the 21st 
century is our greatest challenge. Such an 
economy in 2050 will satisfy the needs of 
more than 9 billion people, who will rightly 
demand equal opportunities for 
development. Delivering such inclusive 
development in a sustainable way, 
however, requires that we remain within the 
boundaries of what our planet can safely 
deliver. Economic growth and sustainability 
are inter-dependent, you cannot have one 
without the other, and greening investment 
is the pre-requisite to realizing both goals. 
Dramatic upgrades in technology, skills, 
policies and business models, along with 
an aligned public consciousness, are 
needed for the transition to a green growth 
pathway. Infrastructure investment required 
for sectors such as agriculture, transport, 
power and water under current growth 
projections stands at about US$ 5 trillion 
per year to 2020. This ‘business-as-usual’ 
investment will not lead to a stable future, 
however, unless it achieves environmental 
and sustainability goals. This development 
needs to be greened by re-evaluating 
investment priorities, building capacity, 
investment-grade policies and improving 
governance, among other activities. 
Additional investment needed to meet the 
climate challenge—for clean energy 
infrastructure, sustainable transport, 
energy efficiency and forestry—is about 
US$ 0.7 trillion per year.
Private financiers see these massive 
investment requirements as an opportunity. 
Today, we see major growth in clean 
energy investment, with financial flows 
worldwide approaching those in carbon-
intensive energy sources. Further, 
developing countries are proving an 
increasingly important source of capital. 
Since 2007, clean energy investment 
originating from outside the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) grew at 27% per 
year compared with 10% per year from 
OECD countries, albeit from a far lower 
base.
Yet today, despite signs of increasing 
private finance into clean energy and other 
green investments, there remains a 
considerable shortfall in investment. 
Closing this gap is our collective task and 
one that we cannot afford to fail. 
Foreword
Public finance, linked to smart, enabling 
policies, has a critical role to play. Given the 
scarcity of public funds, governments’ 
contributions to closing the gap will depend 
on their effectiveness in mobilizing private 
investment. Experience demonstrates this 
is possible when supported by targeted 
financing mechanisms and institutional 
arrangements that blend private and public 
interests, expertise and resources to 
reduce risk and address bottlenecks 
preventing private investment. 
The Green Growth Action Alliance was 
created to accelerate this agenda at the 
2012 G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico. 
The Alliance’s vision, one that I share and 
actively promote as its founding chair, is to 
drive greater investment in green growth by 
unlocking potential sources of finance. 
Collaboration between business, 
governments, civil society and international 
organizations in overcoming barriers to and 
securing the benefits of green growth is the 
DNA of the Alliance’s approach.
The Green Investment Report is the first 
report of the Alliance. It aims to inform and 
inspire policy-makers and public and private 
finance providers to close the gap in 
delivering inclusive, sustainable growth. It is 
the first time that a number of important 
institutions have joined to deliver a powerful 
message about the scale of the green 
investment gap that must be filled, and to 
spell out the ways and means to address 
the gap in green infrastructure investment. I 
appreciate this collective effort and would 
like to thank, in particular, Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance, the Climate Policy Initiative, 
the Global Green Growth Institute, the 
International Energy Agency, the OECD, the 
United Nations Environment Programme, 
the World Bank Group and the World 
Resources Institute for providing data, 
analysis, case studies and other support 
that enabled us to produce this report. I 
would also like to thank and congratulate the 
World Economic Forum  for coordinating the 
whole effort and producing this report.
The Green Investment Report is one of 
many ways in which the Alliance is 
advancing green growth. Its members are 
collaborating on initiatives that aim to prove 
the efficacy of financing green growth, from 
energy efficiency to renewable energy and 
climate-smart agriculture. It is, as the name 
states, an alliance for action. I invite G20 
governments, public finance institutions, 
investors and policy-makers to read this 
report and join us in leading the way to 
making a difference.
Felipe Calderón, 
Chair, Green Growth 
Action Alliance
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We live in an age of increasingly complex global challenges that 
mandate new approaches.  As we witness the combined—and 
increasingly inter-related—challenges of the global economic 
crisis and the climate change crisis, we also witness  the need 
for new forms of both dynamic and resilient global leadership to 
solve these challenges, using innovative, multistakeholder 
approaches. Arguably, mobilising the required scale of green 
investment lies at the core of the combined global economic 
and climate challenge and demands new such approaches for 
triggering action. This makes it a pertinent agenda for the World 
Economic Forum. Since receiving an invitation to create the 
2009 G20 multistakeholder Task Force on Low Carbon 
Prosperity, the Forum has been delighted to support its 
members and stakeholders to trigger public-private innovation in 
this space, including the 2010 Critical Mass Climate Finance 
Initiative with the United Nations Foundation and the International 
Finance Corporation, supported by various institutional investor 
groups; and support to the 2011 Green Growth “Business 20” 
(B20) Task Force for the French G20 Chair. From its investor 
community, the Forum also ran a successful series of 
complementary Green Investment Reports, 2009-2011, 
reporting on the state of the global clean energy investment 
agenda.
During 2012, the World Economic Forum brought together these 
various workstreams to assist the Mexican G20 Chair with a 
series of refreshed B20 Task Forces that provided guidance and 
input to the G20 Summit in Los Cabos, including a Task Force 
on Green Growth. The Green Growth Task Force brought 
together for the first time leading public finance agencies, private 
investors, infrastructure and agriculture companies, and 
inter-and non-governmental organizations, with a specific focus 
to set recommendations for green growth. Task Force members 
took the decision to supplement their set of G20 
recommendations with an offer to launch the Green Growth 
Action Alliance, a practical vehicle for action with a clear mission 
to advance the green investment agenda and to report on 
progress to the G20.  
The World Economic Forum is honoured to serve as the 
Secretariat of the Green Growth Action Alliance, and to help its 
members to achieve impact through advancing new solutions, 
engaging a wider set of public and private finance providers, and 
providing workable models on finance to existing platforms and 
institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, the United Nations Sustainable Energy for 
All Initiative, the World Bank Group, the International 
Development Finance Club, the Global Green Growth Institute, 
and the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change.  
The Alliance now counts nearly 60 members collaborating to 
identify ways that limited public funds and public policies can be 
targeted to unlock and scale up private-sector investment, 
through identifying innovative financing and de-risking 
structures, supporting pilot-testing of new models in key regions, 
and feeding results into international processes.  We hope this 
first report will provide a blueprint for action that government, 
business and civil society leaders can use to transform the 
global economy to an economically and environmentally 
sustainable pathway.  We look forward to reporting on our 
progress in the future.
Preface
Dominic Waughray, 
Senior Director, 
Environmental Initiatives
Thomas Kerr, 
Director, Climate Change 
and Green Growth 
Initiatives
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Figure i: The evolution of global new asset finance flows for 
clean energy (US$ billions)
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Executive Summary
Greening global economic growth is the only way to satisfy the 
needs of today`s population and up to 9 billion people by 2050, 
driving development and well-being while reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and increasing natural resource productivity.
Considerable progress has been made in transitioning to 
green growth. Global investment in renewable energy in 2011 hit 
another record; up 17% on 2010 to US$ 257 billion. This 
represented a six-fold increase from 2004 and was 93% higher 
than in 2007, the year before the global financial crisis. Global 
agricultural productivity growth rates are exceeding overall 
population growth rates, and since 1990, more than 2 billion 
people have gained access to improved drinking water sources. 
Energy efficiency is widely recognized as providing economic 
opportunities and improved environmental security, while the fuel 
efficiency of vehicles has more than doubled since the 1970s.
Developing countries are playing a growing role in scaling up 
green investment. Cross-border and domestic investment 
originating from non-OECD countries grew 15-fold between 
2004 and 2011 at a rate of 47% per year (compared with 27% 
per year for OECD-originating investment), albeit from a low 
base. Clean-energy asset financing originating from developing 
countries in 2012 is on track for the first time to exceed those 
originating from developed countries. This investment is due in 
part to the creation of green growth strategies by a number of 
developing country governments—to advance water resources, 
sustainable agriculture, and clean energy.  Developing country 
public finance agencies can accelerate this trend by targeting 
more of their funds to leverage private finance.
Such progress, however, remains inadequate. Progress in 
green investment continues to be outpaced by investment in 
fossil-fuel intensive, inefficient infrastructure. As a result, 
greenhouse gas levels are rising amid growing concerns that the 
world is moving beyond the point at which global warming can 
be contained within safe limits. A recently published World Bank 
report warns that the world is on track for a global average 
temperature increase of at least 4°C above pre-industrial levels, 
bringing further extreme heat-waves, hurricanes and life-
threatening rises in sea levels. Natural resource productivity is 
not increasing quickly enough to stem the depletion of critical 
resources, notably water and forests. Soil erosion is accelerating 
and fish stocks are declining precipitously. Such trends, 
combined with growing climatic instability, are driving up 
commodity prices, threatening food security in a growing 
number of communities. 
Significant barriers exist to securing the required scale and 
pace of progress. The continuing global economic crisis has 
dimmed longer-term outlooks by business and governments. 
Financing for much-needed infrastructure is constrained by 
limits in public finance, policy and market uncertainty and the 
unintended consequences of financial market reform. Legacy 
fiscal measures such as fossil-fuel subsidies combine with the 
slow progress of international climate negotiations to weaken 
market signals that might otherwise incentivize green 
investment. Lack of awareness of private finance providers of 
green growth opportunities and continued investment in 
fossil-based resources are restricting progress.
Greening investment at scale is a precondition for achieving 
sustainable growth. The investment required for the water, 
agriculture, telecoms, power, transport, buildings, industrial and 
forestry sectors, according to current growth projections, stands 
at about US$ 5 trillion per year to 2020. Such business as usual 
investment will not deliver stable growth and prosperity. New 
kinds of investments are needed that also achieve sustainability 
goals.Beyond the known infrastructure investment barriers and 
constraints, the challenge will be to enable an unprecedented 
shift in long-term investment from conventional to green 
alternatives to avoid locking in less efficient, emissions-intensive 
technologies for decades to come.
Taking the power sector as an example, investment in fossil-fuel 
intensive infrastructure is increasing annually and is higher than 
clean-energy investment. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
predicts that an unprecedented long-term shift in investment 
over the next few decades from fossil fuels towards a cleaner 
energy portfolio is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. 
This is achievable by re-evaluating investment priorities, shifting 
incentives, building capacity, investment-grade policies and 
improving governance.
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Figure ii: Conceptual assessment framework
Figure iii: Total estimated investment requirements under 
business as usual and estimated additional costs under a 2°C 
scenario 
Figure iv: Potential public-private finance mobilization to close 
the cost gap for climate-specific investment
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‘greened’ is not assessed. #Sectors assessed limited to transport vehicles, power, industry, 
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Sources: OECD2,3, IEA4, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)5, United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)6
Note: All data converted to $ 2010 equivalents
Note: The debt-to-equity ratio is assumed at 70:30 based on the current average debt to equity 
ratio of clean energy projects
There are additional, incremental investment needs of at least 
US$ 0.7 trillion per year to meet the climate-change 
challenge. This investment is needed for clean energy 
infrastructure, low-carbon transport, energy efficiency and 
forestry to limit the global average temperature increase to 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels.  While the IEA predicts that 
corresponding fuel savings will more than compensate for these 
investment needs, there are significant policy, market and 
financial barriers preventing business from taking advantage of 
these profitable investments. Additional investment needed to 
support green growth, beyond business-as-usual spending, in 
other sectors such as agriculture and water is not well known; 
further analysis is needed to better understand the full set of 
green investment needs across these areas.
Closing the green investment gap is affordable but needs to 
be supported by effective public policy. Public resources are 
limited, especially during the current period of austerity 
measures across much of the OECD. Therefore, reliance on 
public-sector investment must be minimised, and more attention 
paid to attracting private finance, which is at the core of the 
green growth transition. Assets being managed in the OECD 
amount to US$ 71 trillion; but deploying these assets toward 
green infrastructure is limited by policy distortions and 
uncertainties, market and technology risks, and reinforced by 
the reluctance of investors to take a longer-term view. 
Experience demonstrates the potential for closing the green 
investment gap by mobilizing private finance through the 
smart use of limited public finance. Evidence from climate-
specific investment illustrates that the targeted use of public 
finance can scale up private financial flows into green investment 
through measures such as guarantees, insurance products and 
incentives, combined with the right policy support.
While leverage ratios are difficult to compare across projects, 
countries and instruments, ratios of 1:5 and above are not 
uncommon, and there are some cases of instruments—such as 
grants—delivering much higher ratios. There is strong potential 
for increased lending, advancing and rolling out de-risking 
instruments, using carbon credit revenues, and targeting grant 
money combined with technical assistance to attract much 
greater private investment.  
The green investment gap can be addressed through the use of 
such instruments. If public-sector investment can be increased 
to US$ 130 billion and be more effectively targeted, it could 
mobilize private capital in the range of US$ 570 billion. This 
would come close to achieving the US$ 0.7 trillion of incremental 
investment required to move the world onto a green growth 
pathway.  However, greening the remaining US$ 5 trillion in 
infrastructure investment will remain a major challenge requiring 
policy reform and a stronger push toward investment-grade policy. 
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Leadership by governments, international financial institutions 
and private investors is needed to address the green 
investment gap. This first Green Investment report includes four 
recommendations that, if understood and acted on, could address 
the gap in green investment:
1. Greening investment, and thereby the economy, is the only 
option.  Building from the 2012 G20 Summit, G20 leaders 
should reaffirm that greening the economy is the only route to 
sustained growth and development.  
2. The transition is financially viable. The incremental costs of 
greening growth are insignificant compared with the costs of 
inaction. To accelerate and guide the green growth 
transformation, governments, investors and international 
organizations must improve efforts to overcome barriers and 
improve global tracking, analysis and promotion of green 
investment.
3. Effective policy pathways and the efficient deployment of 
public finance to green investment is well understood, 
tried and tested, and must now be scaled up. The G20 
governments must accelerate the phasing-out of fossil-fuel 
subsidies, enact long-term carbon price signals, enable 
greater free trade in green technologies, and expand 
investment in climate adaptation. Investment-grade public 
policy is an important prerequisite to engage the private 
sector. Public financial institutions need to more actively 
engage private investors through scaling up deployment of 
proven instruments and mechanisms, while also designing 
new funds and tools to attract private finance for new 
investment opportunities.
4. Private investors will need to take a new approach to 
benefit from green investment opportunities. Green 
infrastructure investment can provide attractive long-term, 
risk-adjusted returns. Private investors should not wait for 
perfect public policies to remove any reasonable risk. They 
can enhance comparative risk analysis of green investment 
by making greater use of investor forums and engagement 
with public finance agencies to advance new financing 
solutions that open up an attractive, sustainable market. 
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Introduction
Meeting global climate and environmental 
goals will require the greening of growth, 
while converting existing carbon-intensive 
assets 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) estimates that our current path will add a further 3 billion 
people in developing countries into the middle classes within 20 
years7. This will create an unprecedented rise in demand for 
energy, water, transport, urban development and agricultural 
infrastructure. Meeting this demand while respecting planetary 
boundaries will be challenging; under current policies, water use 
is predicted to increase by 55% between now and 20508. 
Agricultural production will need to double in the same time 
span, leading to large-scale deforestation unless cultivation 
practices change. Energy demand, if left unimpeded, will rise by 
85% by 20509, leading to a 4–6°C increase in global average 
surface temperatures. This will bring further extreme heat-
waves, hurricanes and life-threatening rises in sea levels. 
Damage from Hurricane Sandy alone, which devastated 
portions of the Caribbean, mid-Atlantic and north-eastern United 
States in October 2012, is estimated to have cost more than 
US$ 60 billion, while more than 250 lives were lost10. 
Greening growth can alleviate the risks from future climate 
change and environmental degradation, and progress is being 
made. In the transport sector, the fuel efficiency of road vehicles 
has more than doubled since the early 1970s11. In 2011, global 
investment in the renewable energy sector hit another record; up 
17% on 2010 to US$ 257 billion, a six-fold increase from 2004. 
Investment was 93% higher last year than in 2007, the year 
before the global financial crisis12. This growth was driven in part 
by government policy support that led to rapid decreases in the 
costs of renewable energy. These policies have come under 
review due to the current fiscal crisis, however, creating volatility 
in the global clean-energy markets in the past year. Markets are 
beginning to consolidate and prices are stabilizing13, with the 
industry showing signs of restructuring.
Further progress has been made in the water and forestry 
sectors. Since 1990, more than 2 billion people have gained 
access to improved drinking water sources – an important 
achievement for one of the Millennium Development Goals – to 
reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation14. In the 
forestry sector, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) estimates that more than US$ 64 billion is invested 
annually in forest protection and reforestation15.
Despite signs of progress, significant barriers still exist to 
securing the required scale and pace of investment in the 
transition to green growth. The continuing economic crisis in 
Europe and the United States, with its rippling global impacts, 
discourages business and governments from developing 
longer-term outlooks. Perverse incentives for carbon-intensive 
growth, such as fossil-fuel subsidies, prevent green technologies 
from gaining competitive advantage. The revolution in shale gas, 
while environmentally beneficial compared with coal, places 
downward pressure on carbon-intensive energy sources. This 
has the effect of making renewables comparatively more costly 
and less attractive investments. Furthermore, green 
technologies often cost more at the outset or are more risky 
investments than conventional alternatives, and this has limited 
the scope for their expansion into areas where they are needed 
most. Policy incentives provided by governments for clean-
energy development have in some instances been removed, 
which has resulted in new policy risks for green-technology 
investment.
Rising costs from climate change are affecting economic 
forecasts. Recent storms demonstrate that conventional, 
business-as-usual investment trends may reduce economic 
resilience in the future by locking in a carbon-intensive path that 
leads to costly environmental damage and adaptation costs in 
the long term16. Greening global growth requires a combination 
of strategically allocating limited public resources, public support 
to promote private-sector engagement, and increasing investor 
confidence. It also necessitates a change in future investment 
priorities and policies, as well as decarbonizing existing and 
planned infrastructure through carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) and energy efficiency.  Current country emission 
reduction targets and climate finance pledges fall well short of 
the required level of action to secure green growth and limit 
temperature rise to manageable levels17.  
Government leaders recognize these challenges and have 
incorporated green growth as an important theme for the G20 
and other international processes. At the 2012 G20 Summit in 
Mexico, the Leaders’ Declaration referenced a number of green 
growth recommendations and welcomed the creation of the 
Green Growth Action Alliance to advance the green investment 
agenda (see Box 1).  
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Box 1:  B20 Task Force on Green Growth: 
Recommendations from the 2012 B20 Summit in Los 
Cabos, Mexico
The B20 Task Force on Green Growth proposed five priority 
actions:
1.  Promote free trade in green goods and services: Initiate 
trade liberalization on sustainable energy products and 
services to eliminate tariffs, local-content requirements and 
other non-tariff barriers, and to coordinate industrial and 
technical standards. Such arrangements will create a 
tangible, positive incentive within the international trading 
system to develop and expand the use of green-energy 
goods and services, helping to accelerate progress on 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions while promoting 
economic growth, access to energy and energy security.
2.  Achieve robust pricing of carbon: Ensure a carbon price 
that is high and sufficiently stable to change behaviours and 
investment decisions. This will strengthen incentives to invest 
in economically and environmentally sustainable 
technologies. G20 leaders should ensure that national targets 
and policies are ambitious enough to create consistent 
international demand for carbon units and provide an 
essential foundation for an international carbon market. 
3.  End and redirect inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies: Develop 
national transition plans to phase out inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies within the next four years and consider redirecting a 
portion of such subsidies to ensure access to energy for the 
poorest and to other public priorities, including green 
infrastructure investments. This will reduce fiscal imbalances, 
increase real incomes and reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and the overall cost of mitigating climate change. 
4.  Accelerate low-carbon innovation: Use revenues from 
carbon pricing measures to increase support for research, 
development, demonstration and pre-commercial 
deployment of low-carbon technologies by pooling 
international efforts. This will underpin innovative resource- 
and energy-efficient solutions, increase competitiveness and 
create business opportunities to drive long-term economic 
growth. 
5.  Increase the leverage of private investments: Scale up risk 
mitigation and co-investment funding structures to help close 
the infrastructure financing gap. G20 leaders should call on 
sources of public finance to move from a project-by-project 
approach to a portfolio one to ensure there is support for 
initial project and programme development. 
Aims of this report
This report is a first step by the Green Growth Action Alliance to 
deliver on the G20 Leaders’ request. It aims to provide a 
common point of reference to guide policy-makers, financial 
institutions and investors as they seek to better understand, and 
address, the global gap in green investment. This report 
documents and synthesizes the best available green investment 
data, research and case studies from a number of leading 
organizations, including Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the 
Climate Policy Initiative, the International Energy Agency, the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
United Nations Environment Programme, the World Bank Group 
and the World Resources Institute, and provides important 
messages for different groups of stakeholders. New analysis is 
also presented on clean-energy asset finance flows, the findings 
of which can be used to guide investment decisions and 
priorities in other sectors. 
Policy-makers and development financial institutions can use 
this report to:
 - Develop a common view on global flows of green investment 
in key sectors
 - Analyse the gap between business-as-usual investment 
levels and the amounts needed to address climate change 
and other environmental challenges
 - Identify successful, replicable interventions that unlock private 
finance with targeted public policies and public finance
Investors can use this report to:
 - Identify the leading green investment sectors and regions
 - Demonstrate success in obtaining attractive returns from 
green investment
 - Suggest mechanisms that target public finance and maximize 
private investment
Report structure
Part 1: Green 
Investment: 
Current Flows and 
Future Needs
Part 2: Unlocking 
Private Finance
Part 3: Catalysing 
Leadership and 
Private Investment
What are global green 
investment flows?
What investment is 
required to achieve 
climate change and 
sustainability targets?
What is the role of 
public funds and 
public policy to 
mobilize private 
finance for green 
growth?
What actions are 
needed to effectively 
scale up green 
investment?
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Part 1: Green Investment: 
Current Flows and Future 
Needs
Securing green growth
 - Investment required for the water, agriculture, telecoms, 
power, transport, buildings, industrial and forestry sectors 
under current OECD growth projections is approximately US$ 
5 trillion per year until 2020.
 - However, this business-as-usual investment will not lead to a 
stable future unless it achieves environmental and sustainability 
goals. Beyond the known infrastructure investment barriers and 
constraints, the challenge will be to enable an unprecedented 
shift in long-term investment from conventionala to green 
alternatives to avoid ‘lock-in’. This can be achieved by re-evalua-
ting investment priorities, shifting incentives, building capacity, 
investment-grade policiesb and improving governance.
 - There are additional investment needs of at least US$ 0.7 
trillion per year to meet the climate challenge. This is needed 
for clean-energy infrastructure, sustainable and low-carbon 
transport, energy efficiency in buildings and industry, and for 
forestry, to limit the global average temperature increase to 
2°C above pre-industrial levels. In other sectors, incremental 
investment needs are unknown and more work is needed to 
understand these.
 - Estimated separately, the additional investment requirements 
beyond current spending for adapting to climate change are 
estimated at US$ 0.1 trillion per year in a 2°C scenario.
Current green investment flows
 - Green investment flows have been summarized from different 
sources for climate-specific investment, notably renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, transport vehicles, forestry and 
climate change adaptation. In other sectors, such as transport 
infrastructure (roads and airports), buildings, industry, water 
and agriculture, flow estimates are lacking but business-as-
usual spending predictions can be used as a proxy.
 - Total investment in climate-change mitigation and adaptation 
in 2011 were estimated at US$ 268 billion from the private 
sector and US$ 96 billion from the public sector (US$ 364 in 
total, of which US$ 14 billion was for adaptation). 
 - For a subset of this climate-specific investment, namely clean-
energy asset finance, investment has been growing at a rate 
of 32% per year since 2004. Investment flows in 2011 were 
up 93% from 2007, the year before the global financial crisis. 
In 2012, Southern-originating flows for clean-energy asset 
financing are set to exceed those originating from the Northc. 
Most of this Southern finance is being used domestically and 
is an important emerging source of capital.
 - Looking through the lens of climate-specific investment, 
financial flows still fail to close the cost gap. There is 
significant regional and technological bias in investment 
patterns. Investment is disproportionately focussed in the 
North and emerging markets, for wind and solar technologies 
in particular. To support global green growth and meet 
emission-reduction goals in a 2°C scenario, investment 
needs to rapidly scale up in other non-OECD countries and in 
general for renewable technologies beyond wind and solar. 
Investment in energy efficiency and sustainable transport are 
also lagging. 
 - Financing for climate-specific investment was split about 1:3 
between public- and private-sector investments in 2011. Part 
2 of this report elaborates on the strong potential for 
increased private sector participation.
Box 1.1: Defining the scope and methodology
Scope of the report
In order to measure, monitor and scale up progress in green 
investment, it is first necessary to define its scope. Efforts to date 
have focused on measuring and tracking investments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) and to reduce the risks 
and impacts of climate change (adaptation). Global spending on 
infrastructure has generally been tracked separately. The 
diagram below presents a conceptual framework for greening 
investment with the scope of assessment for this edition of this 
report. There is no comprehensive assessment of investment in 
the various sectors. Data gaps have been identified for current 
investment flows and future investment requirements in non-
energy related sectors. Future editions of this report will aim to 
offer strategies to close these gaps, with a longer-term aim of 
obtaining a clearer picture of green-growth spending.
c Southern countries are defined as non-OECD members and Northern countries are defined as 
OECD members throughout this report.
a The term conventional investment used throughout this report refers to typical business-as-
usual investments, such as for fossil fuel-based power generation and transport, or 
infrastructure where alternatives exist that are more sustainable in their long-term environmental 
and social impact.
b Investment-grade policies are ones that are well designed to create an attractive and stable 
investor environment by reducing the risks of investing and increasing returns (UNEP Finance 
Initiative).
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The frame of the assessment, which can be expanded in later 
editions, includes a synthesis of investment requirements from 
different sources (detailed in Appendix 1) to support growth 
under current projections. A subset of this business-as-usual 
investment needs to be ‘greened’ to ensure that investments are 
sustainable for a transition to green growth. This subset, 
however, has not been quantified in this edition of the report.
In addition to investment for growth, additional investment is needed 
beyond business-as-usual spending in order for green technologies 
to limit climate-change temperature increases to 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels. This is assessed for transport vehicles, power, 
industry, buildings and forestry, but is unknown for other sectors, 
such as agriculture and water. The combination of ‘greened’ 
business-as-usual investment and investment needed for green 
technologies comprise the total investment needs in a green-growth 
model for securing a sustainable future under a 2°C scenario.
The assessment of sectors in this edition of the report is not 
exhaustive and is based on data availability. Future editions will 
aim to expand the number of sectors assessed and the scope of 
that assessment.
Defining green growth and green investment
Various definitions of green growth exist18. For the purposes of this 
report the definition adopted by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (UNSG) High Level Panel on Global Sustainability is applied. 
The High Level Panel sets out a vision for growth that 
eradicates poverty and reduces inequality, while combating 
climate change and respecting a range of other planetary 
boundaries. In this context, an inclusive green-growth strategy is an 
important driver for innovation and creating sustainable wealth19.
Green investment is a broad term closely related to other 
investment approaches such as socially responsible investing 
(SRI) and sustainable, long-term investing. As most green 
investment is needed to retrofit existing and develop new 
infrastructured, this report focuses on infrastructure spending 
but acknowledges the need for non-infrastructure spending, 
such as for capacity building, deployment, training and research 
and development, to enable green and inclusive growth20.
Methodology
This report collects and analyses three categories of data:
 - Investment requirements in a business-as-usual scenario, 
under current policies. These are estimates of investment 
requirements to 2030 to support economic growth projections in 
a range of sectors, based on models and predictions from the 
OECD, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in a 
scenario where green growth and climate change is not a priority. 
 - Investment requirements in a 2°C scenario, where climate 
change is a priority. These are estimates from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), UNEP and the World Bank of investment 
requirements to 2030 in a range of sectors based on a scenario 
where the effects of climate change are kept at bay.
 - Current known and historical investment flows. These are 
limited to climate-specific investments: mitigation and 
adaptation, summarized by the Climate Policy Initiativee. 
The investment landscape and cost gap: Business-as-usual 
investment data was collated from the sectors outlined above and is 
presented below. Any incremental costs were calculated by 
subtracting the investment requirements in a scenario that aims to 
stabilize the global climate at 2°C from those under a business-as-
usual scenario. Climate-change adaptation investment requirements 
were not aggregated and are presented separately. Collated data 
was not altered in any way, apart from converting United States 
dollar amounts to their 2010 rate for ease of comparison. All data 
sources, assumptions and calculations are provided in Appendix 1. 
It should be noted that the investment gaps presented in this report 
should be taken as indicative, and as a lower-range estimate, 
because further work is required to include other sectors and 
incremental costs to strengthen the scope of the analysis.
Green investment flows: A subset of climate-specific public and 
private investment is studied in more depth. Of this investment, 
new-build asset finance for clean energy (comprising about half 
of the total investment) is presented in directional flows between 
countries and domestic sources of finance.
About US$ 5 trillion in global infrastructure investment is 
required per year to 2030 in various sectors; this investment 
must be greened to secure future growth
To support a future global population of 9 billion people an estimated 
US$ 5 trillion per year needs to be invested in global infrastructure 
(~US$ 100 trillion over the next two decades, Figure 1.2). This 
business-as-usual approach would maintain investment in 
conventional, emissions-intensive technologies, endangering future 
growth. A 2012 World Bank report21 highlighted that the planet is on 
track for a global average temperature rise of at least 4°C beyond 
pre-industrial levels, which would bring impacts detrimental to 
growth, including unprecedented heat waves, severe droughts and 
major floods. The McKinsey Global Growth Institute has estimated 
that rates of environmental degradation are unsustainable for the 
long-term functioning of the global economy22. Existing and future 
investment, therefore, must be greened to avoid dangerous levels of 
climate change and adverse environmental impacts that could 
erode the benefits from new green developments; if non-green 
investments continue to grow in parallel with increased investment in 
green infrastructure, it will not be possible to achieve green growthf.
e The scope of current mitigation flows includes: investment in renewable energy generation, 
energy efficiency, sustainable transport, agriculture, forestry and land-use, waste and waste 
water, capacity building and technical assistance, fuel switching and others. The scope of 
current adaptation flows includes: investment in agriculture and forestry, water preservation, 
supply and sanitation, infrastructure, capacity building and technical assistance, disaster risk 
reduction and others.
f For example, the World Resources Institute estimate that 1,199 new coal-fired power plants with 
a combined capacity of 1.4 TW are currently being proposed globally, with China and India 
together accounting for 76% of the proposed capacity (Global Coal Risk Assessment, WRI, 
November 2012). Without carbon capture and storage, these investments significantly dampen 
the benefits of parallel investment in clean energy.
d Infrastructure can be defined as the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities 
needed to operate a society or enterprise that enables economic growth and facilitates the 
everyday life of citizens. Infrastructure can refer to transport (vehicles, roads, rail), water, energy 
and telecommunications. Green infrastructure can be defined as infrastructure that enables 
economic growth and at the same time improves the environment (quality of air, health of citizens), 
helps conserve natural resources, reduces emissions and enables adaptation to climate change. 
Green infrastructure could include renewable and low-carbon power plants, sustainable and 
low-carbon vehicles and transport, and energy-efficient, climate-resilient buildings.
Figure 1.1: Conceptual assessment framework and scope of 
this report
 Existing
infrastructure
investment^
needs to
be greened
Infrastructure
investment*
required to
support global
growth
Business-as-usual 
approach 
Green growth 
Transition 
Additional
investment#
Required to 
deliver green 
growth 
+ 
Enabling policy conditions, tools,
mechanisms and instruments
Notes: *Sectors assessed include water, agriculture, forestry, telecommunications, transport, power, 
buildings and industry. ^ Quantity of business-as-usual investment that needs to be ‘greened’ is not 
assessed. #Sectors assessed limited to transport vehicles, power, industry, buildings and forestry.
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While greening investment is one aspect of the challenge, the 
key is to secure financing for infrastructure needs in general. 
Approximately US$ 24 trillion is earmarked to be spent on 
infrastructure before 2030, falling short of the cumulative US$ 60 
trillion needed28. Development capital needs are in addition to 
the annual US$ 5 trillion figure cited in this report, and the IEA 
estimates that the share of energy-related investment in public 
research, development and demonstration has fallen by two 
thirds since the 1980s29. Better inter-agency planning and 
strategic integration is required to determine common green-
growth goals between sectors.
More work is needed to better understand the investment needs 
in the agriculture, water, transport infrastructure and 
telecommunications sectors. In the power generation, buildings, 
industry and transport vehicles sectors, the IEA has estimated 
there will be significant incremental capital costs for technologies 
beyond business-as-usual spending. Business-as-usual and 
incremental costs in sectors beyond the scope of assessment 
have not been assessed in this edition of the report.
It is possible that for some sectors, the incremental costs could be 
lower for some types of infrastructure in a 2°C scenario compared 
with a business-as-usual scenario. For example, investment in 
infrastructure to transport and distribute oil and gas should be less 
than the US$ 155 billion per year (2005 US$) projected by the 
OECD under a business-as-usual approach. Transporting fossil 
fuels accounts for more than 40% of the tonnage of maritime trade 
and more than 40% of rail tonnage in the USA; so the expected 
increases in investments in port and marine infrastructure under a 
business-as-usual approach should be lower in a 2°C scenario30.
In all sectors, the green-growth challenge is multi-faceted:
 - Capital costs for infrastructure to support growth are high and 
not being met. Other than clean energy, investment flows are 
not well documented.
 - To ensure growth is sustainable, an unprecedented shift in 
long-term investment is required from conventional to green 
alternatives, producing synergies between development and 
the greening of growth.
 - There are also incremental investment needs for technologies 
such as CCS that carry greater risks for investors.
 - Research and development spending is equally important to 
help demonstrate and commercialize green technologies.
Table 1.1 collates and normalizes as much as possible the 
investment requirements from different sources for various 
sectors under business-as-usual growth and under a 2°C 
scenario.
The next section in this chapter focuses on the agriculture and 
water sectors, where the incremental costs under a 2°C scenario 
are not well known; a qualitative explanation is offered. More work 
is also needed to understand the financial implications for 
adaptation in the IEA’s Current Policies (6°C) scenario, and the 
incremental costs for the telecommunications sector. Finally, this 
chapter estimates incremental costs (under a 2°C scenario) for the 
energy, buildings, industry, transport and forestry sectors.
Figure 1.2: Total estimated business-as-usual investment 
requirements and additional investment under a 2°C scenario
For policy makers 
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Power generation 6,933 347 10,136 507 3,203 160 IEA
Power 
transmission and 
development
5,450 272 5,021 251 -429 -21 IEA
Energy total 12,383 619 15,157 758 2,774 139
Buildings 7,162 358 13,076 654 5,914 296 IEA
Industry 5,100 255 5,800 290 700 35 IEA
Building & 
Industrial total
12,262 613 18,876 944 6,614 331
Road 8,000 400 8,000? 400? - - OECD
Rail 5,000 250 5,000? 250? - - OECD
Airports 2,300 115 2,300? 115? - - OECD
Ports 800 40 800? 40? - - OECD
Transport vehicles 16,908 845 20,640 1,032 3,732 187 IEA
Transport total 33,008 1,650 36,740 1,837 3,732 187
Water 26,400 1,320 26,400? 1,320? - - OECD
Agriculture 2,500 125 2,500? 125? - - FAO
Telecommunications 12,000 600 12,000? 600? - - OECD
Forestry 1,280 64 2,080 104 800 40 UNEP
Other sectors unknown unknown unknown unknown unknown unknown
Total investment 99,833 4,991 113,753 5,689 13,934 698
~$100 tr ~$5 tr ~$114 tr ~$5.7 tr ~$14 tr ~$0.7 tr
Table 1.1: Annual estimated investments needed under a 
business-as-usual and low-carbon scenario (US$ billions per 
year between 2010 and 2030) 
Sources: OECD31,32, IEA33, FAO34, UNEP35. Data presented in US$ 2010 rates.
Note: Total investment does not include synergy effects that can occur between other investments 
besides energy, buildings and industry and transport. The total amount provided is a proxy of 
future investment. Investment in water and telecommunications infrastructure covers the OECD 
and emerging markets only. Investment in agriculture covers 93 developing countries only. See 
Appendix 1 for full details of assumptions, scope and calculations.
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The World Bank estimates the cost of adapting to a 2°C increase 
in global average temperatures will be US$ 85–121 billionh per 
year between now and 205040. However, under the IEA’s 
Current Policies scenario (6°C), adaptation costs will be signifi-
cantly higher and have not yet been fully estimated, for example, 
to ensure that disasters are managed and development is more 
resilient to extreme weather events. Furthermore, there is no 
certainty that adaptation is possible beyond 2°C of warming41. 
The Climate Policy Initiative estimates investment flows for climate 
adaptation of US$ 12–16 billion in 201142, implying a shortfall of 
US$ 69–109 billion per year in adaptation investment. 
At least US$ 0.7 trillion in incremental costs beyond business-
as-usual spending is required to support green growth
Aside from the challenge of greening investment in the sectors 
described above, to achieve climate stabilization at 2°C at least 
US$0.7 trillion in incremental, net investment is needed 
beyond spending under a business-as-usual approach (a further 
~US$ 14 trillion by 2030)i. Data on current and historical investment 
flows in low-carbon transport, building energy efficiency and green 
industrial spending is insufficient. Further analysis is needed to 
improve estimates of the necessary investment flows beyond what 
is predicted under a business-as-usual scenario. To define the 
incremental cost gap, this section assumes investment will follow a 
business-as-usual path in line with the IEA’s Current Policies (6°C) 
scenario.
The incremental costs are for investments in power generation, 
transport vehicles, energy efficiency in buildings and industry 
(sourced from the IEA) and forestry (sourced from UNEP Finance 
Initiative). The US$ 0.7 trillion per year in net new investment takes 
into account an estimated US$ 146 billion per year in business-as-
usual energy spending that would need to be redirected from 
conventional outlays for fossil fuel-powered electricity, heat and 
transport to less-emitting options. Setting forestry aside, half of 
the incremental cost is needed for energy efficiency while the 
remainder is needed to cover investments to decarbonize power 
generation and transport. 
The IEA estimates that these incremental costs are economi-
cally viable: the corresponding predicted fuel savings will 
more than compensate for the higher investment needs in 
the transition to a low-carbon energy sector. Between 2010 
and 2050, even when applying a 10% discount rate to savings 
from reduced demand for coal, gas and oil, the IEA forecasts a 
net saving of about US$ 5 trillion over the period, indicating that 
decarbonizing the energy system is clearly affordable43. 
More spending will need to be diverted from conventional to 
clean power in the future, with a much higher proportion of 
spending targeted in the renewables sector under a 2°C scenario
 - The IEA estimates that total investment requirements of the 
power sector are US$ 758 billion per year or US$ 15 trillion to 
2020j (Figure 1.3).
 - Investments are needed in conventional (fossil) and clean and 
renewable technologies but reduced investment in fossil 
fuel-based energy generation provides some relief (46%) 
towards the incremental capital required for renewables, 
nuclear and carbon capture and storage.
 - For coal and gas power, carbon capture and storage is a 
critical technology that requires much greater investment; 
US$ 52 billion per year in total to 2030 on top of the 
investment needs for gas and coal power generation. 
 - By 2050, almost all gas and coal power infrastructure will need 
to have carbon capture and storage under the 2°C scenario44.
h Numbers adjusted to US$ 2010 rates.
i See Appendix 1 for a breakdown of investment needs and sectoral scope assumptions.
ji Power sector investment scope includes: coal, gas, transmission and distribution, renewable 
energy such as wind, solar and others, nuclear and carbon capture and storage.
g This number is an underestimate, covering mainly urban water services and to a lesser extent 
rural water services. It relates to mainly replacement, maintenance and repair in Europe and North 
America rather than additions to existing networks.
Agriculture
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has estimated the 
gross investment requirements for primary agriculture in 
developing countries at US$ 125 billion per year to 2030. The 
FAO further breaks this investment down by the need to replace 
existing capital stock (60%) and for new capital stock (40%) to 
increase agricultural productivity to double current levels by 
205036. In practice this means that energy for production will 
need to be low carbon (for both vehicles and electricity needs), 
and research and development will need to focus on livestock 
and crop practices that reduce emissions, require less fertilizer 
and chemical input, and provide climate-resilient crop varieties. 
Agricultural growth needs to be more inclusive, supporting the 
equitable reduction of poverty and hunger, and balanced with 
preserving existing high-value ecosystems. This productivity 
revolution in the sector could require additional costs beyond 
current spending but no estimates exist of the incremental cost 
for greening the agricultural sector. 
The International Food Policy Research Institute estimates 
that only 6% of investment in agriculture in developing 
countries is from private sources, compared with 55% in 
developed nations37. Private investment from foreign and 
domestic sources will need to be mobilized to deliver most 
capital requirements, particularly for equipment, to develop 
infrastructure and maintenance, and for research and 
development for new crop varieties and breeds. Reducing 
subsidies for input-intensive agriculture could release funding to 
bring about private investment.
Water
As the world’s population tripled in the 20th century, water 
consumption increased in absolute amounts and per capita. 
Rapid demographic and economic growth has put increasing 
pressure on the quality and quantity of water resources. With a 
growing population, water resources must be managed 
effectively to address water pollution, excessive consumption, 
preserve the ecology and the environment, and to safeguard the 
hydrological cycle in general while providing adequate, long-
term supplies of acceptable-quality water for domestic, industrial 
and agricultural needs. 
The OECD estimates that US$ 1.3 trilliong needs to be 
invested annually38 to replace and maintain water 
infrastructure in developed countries and emerging markets 
alone. In addition to these baseline financial needs, effective 
policies and finance are needed to support new, resilient 
infrastructure. 
Climate change adaptation
A world that is at least 2°C warmer than in pre-industrial times 
will experience heightened rainfall and more frequent and 
intense weather events, such as flooding, droughts and heat 
waves. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
(IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report illustrates the strong links 
between climate adaptation and growth. For example, more 
than one sixth of the world’s population lives in areas supplied by 
glacial melt water, and as glaciers decline, so will long-term 
water availability. Coastal areas are in danger of being flooded 
due to impending rises in sea levels, with poorer communities 
the most vulnerable due to lack of adaptive capabilities. Highly 
negative health impacts are predicted from increased 
transmission of disease39.
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Fuel savings from gasoline and diesel more than compensate for 
the incremental costs required in the transport sector
 - The IEA estimates that more than US$ 1 trillion per year to 
2030 is needed in transport vehicle investment  (~US$ 21 
trillion over the next two decades)46; the OECD predicts that a 
further US$ 0.8 trillion is needed per year in transport 
infrastructure .
 - The net additional investment required compared with a 
business-as-usual scenario is estimated at US$ 187 billion 
per year, taking into account a diversion of US$ 26 billion per 
year from gasoline vehicles to greener alternatives, such as 
hybrid vehicles, electric and natural-gas powered vehicles.
 - Under the 2°C scenario, US$ 784 billion per year will 
become available from gasoline and diesel-fuel savings, of 
which just US$ 69 billion will be needed to cover increased 
costs of natural-gas usage, biofuels, electricity and hydrogen. 
Approximately US$ 296 billion per year in incremental energy-
efficiency investment is needed in the buildings sector to 2030
 - The IEA estimates that more than US$ 13 trillion overall needs 
to be invested in energy efficiency over the next two decades 
in the buildings sector. This will be crucial to reduce the 
demand for producing new energy.
 - New buildings will need to meet stringent energy-
performance requirements, while existing buildings will need 
retrofits with longer paybacks; this raises the importance of 
financing mechanisms, discussed further in Part 2 of this 
report, to help unlock energy efficiency investment for 
commercial and residential buildings.
Incremental costs in the industrial sector are estimated at US$ 
35 billion per year to 2030
 - In the five most energy-intensive sectors (cement, iron and 
steel, pulp and paper, aluminium and chemicals and 
petrochemicals), significant opportunities exist in improved 
energy management, fuel switching, recycling and carbon 
capture and storage to capture process emissions.
 - Compared with a business-as-usual scenario, the 
incremental investment required for a 2°C pathway is lower 
than in other sectors, estimated by the IEA at US$ 35 billion 
per year47.
Figure 1.3: Total estimated investment required per year to 
2030 in power generation (US$ billions)
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m Calculations as of 2006.
n Climate-specific investment flows for adaptation are estimated by the Climate Policy Initiative 
(2012) from various sources and include: agriculture and forestry; water preservation; supply and 
sanitation; infrastructure; capacity building/technical assistance; disaster risk reduction, and 
others.
o Other climate-specific investment flows for mitigation include agriculture, forestry, land-use, 
waste and waste water, capacity building/technical assistance, fuel switching and others.
An additional US$ 40 billion per year is needed in the forestry 
sector
Forests play a central role in climate regulation and carbon 
sequestration, and one billion people rely on forest ecosystems 
for shelter, food, fuel, jobs, water, medicine and security. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated that the forest 
industry contributed almost US$ 0.5 trillion to global GDP in 
200648. Competition from other industries, such as agriculture, 
for land use puts pressure on forest ecosystems, resulting in the 
current unsustainable rates of deforestation. In many countries, 
much of the native forest cover has been stripped to support 
charcoal production, and in others, reliance on wood fuel for 
cooking can lead to increased pressures on local forests and 
natural resources49.The green investment challenge for forests is 
to provide policies and incentives that help avoid unsustainable 
deforestation, encouraging green growth and driving resource 
productivity, particularly in developing countries.
 - UNEP estimates that approximately US$ 64 billion is 
invested in forests annuallym, of which 28% is spent on 
forest management and the remainder invested in forest 
product processing and trade.
 - An additional investment of US$ 40 billion per year is 
needed for reforestation (54% of the total) and to pay 
landholders to conserve their forests (46% of the total).
 - Through this additional investment, forest area is predicted to 
increase, leading to 28% higher carbon storage, greater 
employment and a gross added value of US$ 600 billion in 
2050 compared with a business-as-usual scenario.
Climate-specific investment flows are growing, with US$ 268 
billion invested per year from the private sector and US$ 96 
billion per year from the public sector
While data from IEA and UNEP indicate at least US$ 0.7 trillion in 
incremental costs for the sectors outlined above, the Climate 
Policy Initiative estimated that approximately US$ 364 billion was 
invested globally in climate-specific project investment in 2011. 
Of this, US$ 14 billion was for adaptationn and the remainder for 
mitigation, chiefly for renewable energy generation (54% of 
mitigation investment), energy efficiency (18%), sustainable 
transport (10%) and other projectso, including land use, waste 
and fuel switching50. The ratio of public to private investment was 
about 1:3 in 2011 (see Figure 1.3). Private sources of investment 
dominated, with approximately one-third of overall climate-
specific investment originating from project developers. 
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Investment in clean energy has rapidly grown over the past few 
years
Investment in clean energyp grew at an average rate of 33% per 
year between 2004 and 2011, with the highest growth in the 
solar sector52. Rapid growth in the industry has partially resulted 
from the reduced cost of wind and solar power combined with 
more generous subsidy programmes. Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance estimates that small-scale solar projects (less than 1 
megawatt) alone attracted US$ 22 billion in the second quarter 
of 2012, 13% up from the same quarter in the previous year. 
Over 2011, solar module prices fell by 50%, and by the end of 
2011 it was also clear that installed renewable energy had 
surpassed overall installed nuclear capacity by 50% globally53.
Clean energy technologies have experienced dramatic cost 
reductions, due to:
 - the adoption by many countries of clean energy policies and 
frameworks over the past decade
 - growth in emerging markets
 - beneficial economic stimulus packages favouring clean 
energy investment
 - rising costs of fossil fuels
The past year, however, has brought signs of slowing investment 
in wind and solar energy as governments have reduced 
subsidiesq. Demand has also dropped following a fall in industrial 
output during the global financial crisis, and the current 
oversupply in the solar and wind sectors could lead to 
consolidation in the market in the short to medium term54.
In the longer term, the current revolution in shale gas could place 
downward price pressure on carbon-intensive energy sources, 
making renewables comparatively less attractive investments. 
While gas (which is less carbon-intensive than coal) will continue 
to be part of the energy mix in a green-growth scenario, its 
contribution will need to decrease over time to less than 3% of 
overall power investment needs by 2050, according to the IEA55. 
Avoiding gas ‘lock-in’ will be a major challenge for governments 
in the coming decade.
Global green investment could be accelerated by focusing more 
on developing country markets as a source of investment
Looking through a clean energy lens, investment in asset finance 
originating from non-OECD countries for both domestic and 
cross-border uses grew from US$ 4.5 billion in 2004 (19% of 
total asset finance) to US$ 68 billion in 2011 (41% of total asset 
finance), at a rate of 47% per year (see Figures 1.5, 1.6). Foreign 
cross-border investment from outside the OECD represented 
the highest growth rate in any clean energy flow category: 61% 
per year on average, a 28-fold increase57. Based on current 
growth rates in investment originating in non-OECD 
countries, clean-energy asset finance flows are expected to 
exceed those originating from the OECD in 2012. In the wake 
of the global financial crisis, investment originating from non-
OECD countries did not slow as much as those from the OECD, 
highlighting their resilience and potential as a source of future 
investment for green growth. 
r Public markets: Funds raised by publicly quoted or over-the-counter/off-exchange trading (OTC) 
supported clean energy companies on the capital markets; Venture capital and private equity: 
Early- and late-stage venture capital funding rounds of clean energy companies as well as funds 
raised privately for expansion; Small distributed capacity: Estimated data of non-tracked 
investment in small scale solar photovoltaic (<1 megawatt). 
 Data sourced from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2012.
p Clean energy asset finance as reported in the Bloomberg New Energy Finance database. Scope 
includes the new-build financing of renewable energy-generating projects, which includes both 
electricity generating and biofuels production assets. Projects may be financed via the balance 
sheets of the project owners or through financing mechanisms, such as syndicated equity from 
institutional investors, or project debt from banks.
q Germany, the UK and Spain are examples where solar photovoltaic feed-in-tariff rates and 
subsidies have been reduced, while in the USA, wind installations are falling, due partly to the 
federal Production Tax Credit expiring. India and China are also phasing out tax incentives for 
wind energy.
Figure 1.4: Climate change mitigation and adaptation 
investment by source of finance (US$ billions)
Figure 1.5: Growth in clean energy investment, by technology 
(US$ billions)
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Targeted public action can address the investment shortfall 
and promote green investment
The need to scale up green investment is evidenced through the 
example of clean energy. As outlined above, total investment 
needs in the power sector in the IEA’s 2°C scenario are US$ 758 
billion annually. Out of this total, 39% (US$ 294 billion) is required 
for renewable energy. Climate-change mitigation flows are 
estimated at US$ 350 billion per year by the Climate Policy 
Initiative (taking into account both public- and private-sector 
flows), of which an estimated US$ 189 billion was spent on 
renewable energy projects in 201161. This indicates a shortfall of 
about US$ 100 billion per year. While this may seem a relatively 
small amount, in reality the shortfall is larger because investment 
is biased towards wind and solar technologies in the OECD and 
emerging markets. Investment in other types of renewable-
energy technologies need to be scaled up equitably across 
regions in order to meet the emission-reduction targets 
predicted by the IEA. Larger investment gaps in Africa and other 
non-OECD countries beyond the emerging markets will be 
challenging to close given the higher level of investment risk in 
these areas.
The Climate Policy Initiative estimated flows in energy efficiency 
investment at US$ 63 billion in 2011, with sustainable transport 
investment at US$ 35 billion62. While there is a lack of 
comprehensive data on investment, these early estimates show 
that these sectors fall short of the required incremental 
investment (US$ 331 and US$ 187 respectively). 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates that annual flows in 
clean energy are increasing more rapidly than in conventional, 
fossil-fuel energy investment. Despite this, overall annual 
investment in fossil-fuel energy remains higher than clean-
energy spending63. While fossil fuels form part of the required 
energy mix in the future, investment needs to decrease over 
time, with a shift to greener technologies. 
The public sector can address the green investment gap by 
unlocking private investment through targeted financial 
mechanisms that reduce risk and lower the cost of capital. At 
the same time, greener alternatives need to be promoted over 
conventional ones through better policy frameworks and a shift 
in incentives and behaviour. Strong carbon-pricing signals and 
removing fossil-fuel subsidies, in particular, play an important 
role in the transition. These actions, if successful, can promote 
long-term financing for green technologies and alleviate the 
barriers to investment. Part 2 of this report expands on these 
barriers and the potential instruments and actions that can help 
unlock the investment needed to support greener growth.
Figure 1.6: Current estimated climate-specific investment flows 
in 2011 (US$ billions)
Figure 1.7: Historical clean energy investment by flow type 
(US$ billion)
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Part 2: Unlocking Private 
Finance
Greening growth will require a significant reconfiguration of current 
and future investment, with further incremental costs beyond a 
business-as-usual approach that need to be financed. Given the 
current financial crisis, public resources are limited, however, and 
the reliance on public-sector investment in the longer term must be 
reduced to ensure sustainable green growth. This places private 
finance at the core of the transition.
Unlocking private finance can be challenging: certain green 
technologies have real or perceived higher risks for a potential 
investor when compared with conventional fossil-based 
investments that have a track record of consistent returns. 
Unfamiliarity with technologies also plays a role, particularly in 
developing and emerging markets where green growth needs 
are particularly high. Green technologies often have higher 
capital costs, especially during the earlier stages of 
development, which can further deter investors.
An emerging body of experience suggests considerable potential 
exists for closing the green investment gap by mobilizing private 
finance through the targeted deployment of public finance. It is 
crucial to reform policies and incentives to give the right signals to 
investors, providing a strong enabling framework for investings. In 
parallel, private sector investment can be achieved by using a 
range of proven instruments and mechanisms to help reduce the 
cost of capital and investment risks.
While public-private finance mobilization and leverage ratios are 
difficult to calculate or compare across projects, countries and 
instruments, ratios of 1:5t and above are not uncommon, and 
there are some cases of instruments, such as grants,  delivering 
ratios of 1:8 and higher.
To close the cost gap to support green growth through targeted 
public action, public investment would need to increase by 
21–46% to US$ 116–139 billion but could act to double 
current private-sector investment to US$ 558–581 billion 
(Figure 2.1). This assumes that public finance has the potential to 
mobilize four to five times its contribution from private sources 
and that all of the public finance is leveraged at this average rate. 
This chapter focuses on the instruments and mechanisms (Table 
2.2) that public agencies can use to accelerate private 
investment in green growth by:
 - improving the risk-reward calculus
 - reducing the cost of capital
 - providing prerequisites and enabling conditions
The analysis of initiatives and case studies (Table 2.1) highlights 
successful examples of finance mobilization throughout this chapter.
Figure 2.1: Current and potential public-private finance 
mobilization to close the cost gap
Table 2.1: Case studies analysed
 Required private 
investment –  
debt 
US$ 342 – 
399 bn 
(60–70%) 
Required private 
investment - 
equity 
US$ 171 – 
228 bn 
(30-40%) 
Required 
private 
investment 
US$ 558– 
581 bn 
Required 
public 
investment 
US$ 116–139 bn 
Total required 
investment: US$ 698bn 
Possible ratio:
1:4–1:5 
(+400-500%) 
Note:  The debt-to-equity ratio in Figure 2.1 is assumed at 70:30 based on the current average debt 
to equity ratio of clean energy asset finance projects according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance
Full details of case studies are given in Appendix 2. Note that some investment sources given in the 
table may be estimated based on the designed financial structure and do not necessarily indicate 
achieved performance.s For a recent review of these issues see:  Corfee-Morlot, J. et al. Toward a Green Investment Policy 
Framework: The Case of Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Infrastructure, Environment Directorate 
Working Papers, No. 48, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012.
t   Indicating that US$ 1 of public funding mobilizes a further US$ 5 of private investment.
Name Country Public 
investment
Private 
investment
Total 
investment
Source
1 Mexico City’s 
Metrobus
Mexico US$ 287 m US$ 119 m US$ 402 m OECD
2 Walney Offshore 
Windfarms
UK Incentive 
mechanisms
~£1,300 m ~£1,300 m Climate Policy 
Initiative
3 Ouarzazate 
Concentrated 
Solar Power Plant
Morocco US$ 2,569 m US$ 253 m US$ 
2,822 m
Climate Policy 
Initiative
4 Energy efficiency 
programmes in 
Thailand
Thailand ~US$ 525 m ~US$ 450 m ~US$ 975 m World 
Resources 
Institute
5 Solar water 
heaters in Tunisia
Tunisia US$ 24 m US$ 110 m US$ 134 m World 
Resources 
Institute/
Climate Policy 
Initiative
6 Wind energy in 
Uruguay
Uruguay ~US$ 7 m ~US$ 2,000 
m (various 
sources)
~US$ 2,000 
(estimated)
UNDP
7 The case of 
watershed 
protection in 
Ecuador and 
Colombia
Colombia US$ 30 m ~US$ 150 m ~US$ 170 m 
(estimated)
World Water 
Council
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Table 2.2: A taxonomy of public instruments and mechanisms 
to create attractive green-growth investment conditions
P
ub
lic
 s
up
p
o
rt
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
P
ub
lic
 fi
na
nc
in
g
 
i n
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
• Feed-in tariffs 
• Tax credit programmes 
• Renewable energy quotas 
• Standards 
• Repealing support for ‘brown’ sectors 
• Grants 
• Subsidies 
• Project aggregation 
• Project lending 
• Debt funds 
• Bonds 
• Concessional/ flexible loan terms 
• Direct capital investment 
• Loan guarantees 
• Insurance 
• Foreign exchange/ liquidity facilities 
Policy and overarching 
policy support 
Project level assistance 
Lending (debt) 
Equity investment 
De-risking instruments 
Instruments and mechanisms Examples 
Source: Adapted from World Resources Institute, 2012
Public action and support can attract private investment by 
improving the risk-reward calculus
Private investment in green technologies faces a number of 
risks:
 - Political risks include changes in government that affect the 
legal system, and the risk of civil unrest in certain countries.
 - Macroeconomic risks include fluctuations in economic 
conditions and commodity prices, interest and exchange 
rates.
 - Policy risks entail regulatory changes, such as those to 
feed-in tariffs or fossil-fuel subsidies that can alter a project’s 
economic viability.
 - Technology and operational related risks are those 
intrinsically related to the technology in question. These range 
from performance-related risks, where revenues might be 
lower than expected, to risks resulting from the lack of or 
unreliable supporting infrastructure, such as electrical and 
water-grid networks.
 - Capacity risks refer particularly to development assistance 
and aid, where institutions and governments are unable to 
ensure funding is disbursed to projects and utilized.
Mobilizing private finance at scale requires that the risks of green 
investments be reduced to about the same levels as those faced 
by alternative, conventional investments (for example, in 
generating fossil fuel-based energy or environmentally sub-
optimal infrastructure). As shown by the case studies in the 
Appendix, development finance institutions, multilateral 
development banks, and domestic governments have 
successfully leveraged significant private investment through 
targeted support.
Insurance and guarantees
De-risking green investments to levels that are palatable to 
investors can be partially achieved by smoothing the investment 
landscape using guarantees and innovative insurance products. 
Political-risk guarantees are particularly useful in developing 
and emerging markets. The World Bank Group’s Multilateral 
Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is one example of a 
political-risk insurance guarantee provider, having provided more 
than US$ 24 billion in insurance coverage since 1988. Between 
2005 and 2011, however, MIGA provided fewer than 10 
guarantees for projects in ‘green’ sectors;64 and MIGA 
guarantees are not available for smaller and medium-sized 
investments. 
Policy-related risks can be mitigated through regulatory risk 
insurance or guarantees. The US Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC), for example, provides investors with 
financing, guarantees, political-risk insurance and support for 
private equity investment funds to help mobilize private capital. 
OPIC also offers regulatory risk coverage specific to renewable 
energy projects. The aim of this type of insurance/guarantee is to 
reduce the risk inherent in investing in non-conventional 
technologies, in non-conventional regions, and to create a level 
playing field for alternative investment choices65. Examples of 
risks covered could include material changes to feed-in tariffs, or 
revoking licences and permits necessary to operate a project. To 
scale up insurance solutions for green investment, it will be 
necessary to align interests, most likely with a public-private 
partnership between the insurance industry and various 
governments and regulators. 
Loan guarantees and partial risk/credit guarantees are 
commonly provided by development finance institutions and 
have also proven useful in ‘on-lending’ arrangements where 
governments underwrite loans provided through intermediaries, 
such as commercial banks or state utility companies. In cases of 
default, the government agency or development finance 
institution can absorb some or all of the risk. This is particularly 
beneficial for new markets where private lenders are not initially 
comfortable or familiar with the technology in question.
Tunisia’s Prosol Programme (see Appendix 2) is an example of 
debt default risk being removed from suppliers of solar water 
heaters. Commercial banks provided loans to customers 
through accredited suppliers, which were repaid through 
customers’ electricity bills. Customers’ services were withheld 
when they did not pay. The state utility acted as debt collector, 
enforcer and loan guarantor, shifting the credit risks from lenders 
to borrowers. This has improved awareness and expertise of 
commercial banks for renewable energy lending.
Work completed by the Green Growth Action Alliance highlights 
the potential role of partial credit guarantees in India to mobilize 
finance at scale, while in Kenya, the Alliance and the UNEP 
Finance Initiative are looking to design a Takeout Finance Facility 
to address the perceived asset-liability mismatch that has been 
identified as a bottleneck for private finance for renewable 
energy lending; local lenders often seem unable to lend beyond 
seven years while project developers seek 15-year loans.
There is significant potential for public sector and public financial 
institutions to provide more guarantees for higher-risk 
investments but guarantees alone cannot improve the 
commercial viability of all investment types. A combination of 
de-risking instruments is needed to bring investment risk down 
to acceptable levels.
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Interest rate and currency facilities
Where project developers need protection against 
macroeconomic risk and/or political volatility (for example, in 
emerging markets) interest rate and currency derivatives and 
facilities can reduce perceived risk. These are typically cross-
border loans provided in the local currency that can protect 
the borrower from volatile fluctuations in the exchange rate, 
thereby avoiding repayments in foreign currency, and liquidity 
facilities, such as lines of credit that can inject short-term cash 
flow into projects, allowing the borrower to manage exchange-
rate fluctuations. Fees are usually required for interest rate and 
currency facilities, which reduce the overall economic viability of 
the investment. As a result, this mechanism is not often used in 
green investing. Government and financial institutions need to 
cooperate to provide these facilities at a lower rate or with no 
charge to encourage private-sector investment in countries 
where green growth is critically required but volatility in the local 
currency is high.
The private-sector facility of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Green Climate Fund 
(GCF), formally established as part of the Cancun Agreements in 
2010, is one contender for providing interest rate facilities and 
guarantees to increase the capacity of banks and encourage 
increased lending for green projects. The GCF’s mandate is to 
help developing nations limit or reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Its main 
role is to channel new, additional public financial resources from 
developed nations to affect private and public finance for 
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The private-
sector facility of the Fund enables it to directly and indirectly 
finance private-sector mitigation and adaptation activities at 
international levels. The mandate is broad and could include a 
range of de-risking instruments to bridge the green technology 
cost gap, instruments such as subordinated debt (described 
below), risk guarantees and even equity66 among others.
Development financial institutions (DFIs) play an important role in 
underwriting loans and offering liquidity facilities at concessional 
rates to reduce macroeconomic risk. The Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC) provides loan guarantees for 
the co-financed portion of green projects. In 2010 and 2011, 
JBIC’s Green Initiative provided an estimated US$ 300 million in 
loan guarantees to local development banks for four renewable 
energy projects in Asia and South America67. Development 
banks are typically more familiar with political risk and 
macroeconomic conditions in developing countries and as such 
are well-placed to increase access to underwriting facilities to 
scale up private-sector investment in these regions68.
Public action and support can attract private investment by 
reducing the cost of capital of green growth
Green technologies are often earlier in the development stage 
and not always commercially viable, making them more 
expensive and riskier ventures. The incremental cost gap 
between conventional and green investments needs to be 
justified and filled, especially at the earlier stages in technology 
development. The private sector will continue to be an increasing 
source of green finance while the public sector has tended to fill 
the incremental green cost gap through policy-support 
mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs and subsidies. In the longer 
term, sustaining such public-sector subsidies is questionable 
given the current economic climate.
Optimal financing structures on a sectoral basis will ultimately 
depend on the context. For example, for energy investment, 
debt provision from banks will play a larger role, while for 
transport-sector investment, the public sector will need to 
provide loss-absorbing equity. As such, the public sector can 
reduce the cost of capital and provide incentives to invest 
through proven interventions.
Lending
Reducing the cost of capital by providing loans (debt) is the most 
common source of finance for up-front and on-going project 
costs. Low-cost debt (concessional finance) from DFIs can 
provide debt at lower interest rates over a longer term compared 
with commercial bank loans and will play a significant role in 
distributing long-term green finance, particularly in developing 
countriesu. Examples include the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (Box 2.3) and the European 
Investment Bank. The European Investment Bank has 
dramatically increased its lending for wind and solar energy in 
particular in recent years and delivered 5.5 billion euros (about 
US$ 7.25 billion) in 2011. Energy efficiency is also a critical sector, 
attracting 1.3 billion euros (US$ 1.7 billion) of EIB’s lending in 
2011. DFIs are also prominent in dispersing money from the 
Climate Investment Funds, which have been shown to mobilize 
significant amounts of co-financing from other sources (see Box 
2.1), highlighting potential for scale-up.
The public sector has also provided loans through financial 
intermediaries such as commercial banks. This approach can 
increase the awareness and willingness to lend in newer or 
less-established markets. In Thailand, the government 
established a revolving fund (see Appendix 2) in 2002 to provide 
loans, grants and subsidies to promote energy efficiency. 
Commercial banks were able to use this funding for energy-
efficiency project loans. This not only encouraged the banks to 
lend in an emerging market but additional finance was also 
mobilized towards the projects. Through the revolving fund, 
financial-sector capacity has increased in the energy sector, and 
loans that have been used to fund capital projects have resulted 
in reducing peak load energy by more than 500 megawatts. 
Mezzanine financing can also help strengthen a project’s equity 
profile because of its lower repayment priority. Mezzanine 
finance provides a hybrid of equity and debt, and gives the 
lender rights to convert outstanding debt to equity. Dong Energy, 
for example, was one of the major investors in the UK Walney 
Offshore Windfarms case study (see Appendix 2). Dong Energy 
extended mezzanine lending facilities to other investors to help 
secure financing for the £1.3 billion (US$ 2.1 billion) project. DFIs 
have also been flagged as potential providers of hybrid equity 
products that could fill critical financing gaps for project 
developers in new markets69. The Global Climate Partnership 
Fund, a public-private initiative, is an example of an innovative 
fund that provides mainly medium- and long-term financing for 
climate change mitigation projects, including mezzanine 
financingv.
Green bonds (Box 2.2) are another emerging source of finance, 
with an estimated market size of US$ 174 billion70, which can 
also help reduce capital costs of green investment and close the 
cost gap.
u For a discussion on the role of multilateral agencies and financial institutions, see: Venugopal, S. 
et al. “Public Financing Instruments to Leverage Private Capital for Climate-Relevant Investment: 
Focus on Multilateral Agencies.” November 2012. WRI Working Paper, World Resources Institute, 
Washington, DC.
v See http://gcpf.lu/ for further details
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Box 2.1: The Climate Investment Funds: progress from the 
one of the first clean investment funds
In September 2008, 10 leading industrialized nations pledged 
more than US$ 6.1 billion to finance two Climate Investment 
Trust Funds (CIFs): the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and 
Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The funds were designed to 
provide financing for climate-related investment to combat 
climate change. They are disbursed as grants, highly 
concessional loans and risk-mitigation instruments71, and are 
administered through multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
such as the World Bank Group.
Clean Technology Fund
The CTF provides highly concessional financing targeted at 
large-scale, country-initiated low-carbon projects in the power 
sector (nearly two thirds of funding), the transport sector (~14% 
of funding) and for energy efficiency (~20% of funding). CTF 
funds have mobilized an estimated US$ 8 in co-financing for 
every dollar allocated from public sources (implying a ratio of 
1:8)72. As of September 2012, nine donor nations had pledged 
US$ 4.8 billion to the CTF Trust Fund, and US$ 1.9 billion was 
approved for 28 projects in 18 countries. This has led to co-
financing of US$ 16.4 billion, of which US$ 6.4 billion (40% of 
total co-financing) is from private sources, with the remaining 
co-finance provided by governments, multilateral financial 
institutions and carbon finance. Taking a leverage definition of 
CTF funding to private sources of co-financing only, the revised 
ratio is 1:3.3. A further 66 projects are awaiting approval of US$ 
2.2 billion of funding, with expected additional co-financing of 
US$ 18.2 billion73.
Strategic Climate Fund
The mandate of the SCF is broader: to provide support for 
various programmes to test innovative approaches to climate 
change. The goals of the SCF74 are to:
 - provide experience and lessons through learning by doing
 - channel new and additional financing for climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation
 - provide incentives for scaled-up and transformational action 
in the context of reducing poverty
 - provide incentives to maintain, restore and enhance carbon-
rich natural ecosystems, and maximize the benefits of 
sustainable development
As of September 2012, US$ 2.2 billion had been pledged from 
13 donors for the SCF. To date, 95 projects have been approved 
across the three programmes, totalling US$ 383 million in grants 
and near-zero interest credits. Funding from the SCF is expected 
to leverage an additional ~US$ 1 billion in co-financing from 
other sources, implying a leverage ratio of 1:2.6.
Box 2.2: Green bonds, projects bonds and institutional 
investors
Green bonds can be used to raise capital to finance, or refinance, 
investments in low-carbon or otherwise environmentally beneficial 
projects. Like conventional bonds, green bonds can be issued by 
a corporate, bank or government entity. The size of the green bond 
market has been estimated at US$ 174 billion75 by HSBC and the 
Climate Bonds Initiative, under a definition that looks beyond 
explicitly labelled ‘green/climate bonds’. Other estimates, including 
those from the OECD, place the market nearer to US$ 86 billion76.
Green bonds are widely believed to have significant potential as 
a means to access deep pools of relatively low-cost capital that 
is held by institutional investors for green and climate change-
related projects. These investors typically avoid direct investment 
in green infrastructure and have historically preferred to invest via 
private equity-style infrastructure funds or through the listed debt 
or equity of infrastructure companies and developers. There are, 
however, an increasing number of exceptionsw to this rule where 
pension funds have invested directly and brought the skills to do 
so in-house. Alongside this trend, institutional investors are often 
seen as natural buyers of green bonds, given their appetite for 
investment in low-risk, fixed-income products with long-term 
maturities that match their long-term liabilities. Institutional 
investors, however, often lack the means to gain exposure to the 
green infrastructure market, but with a credit-rated and 
potentially liquid green bond market, institutional investors could 
potentially channel far more funds into the sector. 
Project bonds are a specific and relatively small subset of the 
larger green bond market. Project bonds provide a means for 
infrastructure project developers to attract long-term debt 
financing from the international or domestic bond markets. This 
can be done by creating a special purpose vehicle, supported 
by a degree of equity from a sponsor (often pooled from project 
developers). Based on an assessment of the financial viability of 
the underlying projects, a credit rating can be secured for the 
vehicle, and if it is sufficiently high, bonds issued. 
Bond finance raised through these means can be cheaper than 
commercial loans and non-recourse project-finance options. This 
can be a significant advantage for clean-energy projects where 
financing can represent a significant proportion of overall costs. 
Project bonds also provide an important opportunity to recycle 
limited quantities of construction capital through refinancing projects. 
w ATP, the Danish pension fund, has its own clean-energy fund, and some pension funds are 
establishing in-house infrastructure investment capabilities. For example AimCo, the Alberta 
Investment Management Corporation, and Calpers, have both invested directly in infrastructure 
projects in the past year.
Table 2.3: Summary of Clean Technology Fund investments 
and sources of co-financing (US$ millions)
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Equity
Public action to either take an equity stake in projects or create 
attractive investment conditions for potential equity providers 
can help raise additional capital through other financing 
mechanisms by absorbing potential losses to other financiers. 
Direct equity investment from the public sector can be valuable 
for projects with heightened technology risks (those, for 
example, at an earlier stage of development or at the pre-
commercial stage). This will be critical in markets with higher risk 
where the appetite for lending is limited.
Pension funds have also been mobilized as a source of private 
finance through careful risk allocation (as seen in the case of 
Walney Offshore Windfarms in the UK). With US$ 71 trillion of 
assets under management in the OECD in 201177, institutional 
investors are a potentially important source of finance for green 
growth. Successfully mobilizing institutional funds in equity 
injections can be achieved through complex financial 
engineering by providing the investor with a ‘quasi fixed-income 
position’, for example, by sharing the benefit of public financing 
incentives (such as feed-in tariffs) in renewable-energy projects. 
A fixed-income position can provide the investor with long-term 
returns in line with their investment strategy and risks. 
Opportunities exist to develop green projects with long-term 
returns that can attract institutional investors but the public 
sector needs to support this through improved policy 
frameworks.
Prerequisites for private-sector finance are required to 
support green growth
Public support is required for overarching policy support 
(renewable energy quotas, feed-in tariffs, eliminating fossil-fuel 
subsidies and other perverse incentives) and project level 
assistance. The latter includes grants, subsidies and technical 
assistance, all of which have been critical to the success of 
green infrastructure projects, as highlighted through case 
studies. Grants often achieve significant ‘leverage’ due to the 
relatively small initial tranche of funding needed for feasibility and 
commercial studies at project conception, while subsidies and 
incentives have been crucial to the success of many large 
renewable energy plants.
The Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) Plant in 
Morocco (see Appendix 2) is an example of how policy support 
helped generate investment in a non-commercially viable 
technology. A substantial subsidy from the government of US$ 
1.2 billion, in the form of a Power Purchase Agreement above 
grid price covering the 25-year lifetime of the project, enabled 
the development of the project. The government and other 
sponsors are betting on the project contributing to the 
development of a CSP market that will bring longer-term benefits 
and economic returns.
In the case of the Walney Offshore Windfarms, the £1.3 billion 
project would not have been possible if not for the benefits 
provided by tradable green-energy certificates. These are 
expected to provide 60% of total project revenues worth 
£1.3–1.5 billion (US$ 2.1–2.4 billion) over the lifetime of the 
project, paid by regional energy suppliers through the United 
Kingdom Government’s Renewable Obligation Certificate 
scheme.
‘Wheeling and banking’ is another support mechanism that has 
brought success in India for wind energy. ‘Wheeling’ (electricity 
transmission and distribution) charges can be reduced to 
provide incentives for excess power to be fed back into the grid. 
When plants deliver more output than required – during high 
winds, for example – excess generation can be ‘banked’ with 
the transmission and distribution company. During low-wind 
seasons, the excess units are then drawn on.
Another policy tool that has been useful in reducing public-
sector costs is ‘reverse auction’, whereby bidders compete to 
supply a service (such as electricity generation) at the lowest 
rates. The lowest rate is chosen as the default rate, keeping 
incentive costs lower for the public sector78.
Grants are often combined with technical assistance to 
maximize the impact of early-stage investment and also 
knowledge transfer. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is 
the world’s largest public funder for environmental projects. 
Since 1991, the GEF has provided US$ 10.5 billion in grants, 
which has mobilized a further US$ 51 billion in co-financing for 
more than 2,700 projects in more than 165 countries. Successful 
projects such as Mexico City’s Metrobus project, wind energy 
development in Uruguay and watershed protection in Ecuador 
and Columbia (see Appendix 2) used GEF grant funding for 
technical assistance and advisory support to help encourage 
private-sector investment by creating national policy frameworks 
for green growth.
Technical assistance (Box 2.3) combined with finance from 
development banks and other lenders have helped promote 
market awareness among consumers, build the capacity of local 
institutions and train local staff, and develop and manage local 
green and climate-policy development. In Uruguay, for example, 
a joint project between UNEP and the Global Environment 
Facility provided a US$ 1 million GEF grant for technical advisory 
support around policy de-risking measures to address multiple 
barriers in the wind-energy market. As a result 40 megawatts of 
wind energy is now installed, and based on the policies 
developed using the grant/technical assistance resources, a 
further 880 megawatts of wind contracts are in the pipeline. 
In 2011, only US$ 10–16 billion was provided in grant funding for 
climate-related investment, or 3% of flows79. Scaling up grant 
funding offers a big opportunity, given the high mobilization of 
co-financing possible and the policy development support that it 
can provide.
Research from the World Resources Institute has shown that 
pre-investment activities can create attractive investment 
conditions for scaling up investment for green growth. The 
Institute provides a framework80 for allocating public finance for 
pre-investment, highlighting that early actions are needed to 
address various barriers, improving the effectiveness of public 
finance to strengthen policy and institutional conditions, and 
industry and financial sector conditions.
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Box 2.3: Combining technical support with lending for 
energy efficiency: highlights from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
The EBRD supports green growth through its Sustainable 
Energy Initiative (SEI), which was launched in 2006 with the aim 
of scaling up sustainable energy investments, improving the 
business environment for sustainable investments and working 
closely with donors to develop effective measures to address 
barriers to market development. To date, the EBRD has financed 
more than 550 SEI projects in 31 countries, amounting to an SEI 
volume of more than 10 billion euros (about US$ 13.2 billion) and 
a total project value of more than 50 billion euros (about US$ 66 
billion). Emission reductions achieved though these projects are 
estimated at 50 million tonnes of CO2 per annum, higher than 
the annual emissions of Hungary in 2010 and equivalent to 
almost 1.4% of the total emissions of the EBRD region. 
To achieve this, the EBRD has developed a unique business 
model to finance sustainable energy projects, combining 
investments with technical assistance and policy dialogue. 
Technical assistance, which has amounted to 187 million euros 
(about US$ 246 million) since 2006, includes various activities, 
ranging from market analysis and energy audits to training and 
raising awareness. As part of its policy dialogue activities, the 
SEI works with governments to help develop strong institutional 
and regulatory frameworks that provide incentives for 
sustainable energy investments. The combination of these three 
activities provides strong support for sustainable energy 
investments.
An industrial project financed by EBRD in Ukraine showed how 
US$ 150,000 of donor funding for energy audits at the client 
resulted in loan financing totalling US$ 55 million, of which US$ 
27 million was dedicated to energy-efficiency measures 
identified in the audits. For energy efficiency finance only, the 
leverage on the donor funds was 1:187. 
To enable projects such as these, the EBRD has established an 
in-house energy efficiency and climate change team consisting 
of more than 30 specialists, including engineers, finance 
specialists and policy experts. This team works directly on 
projects with bankers and clients, and manages technical 
assistance projects for capacity building, technical advice, 
project implementation support and improving the investment 
climate for energy efficiency and renewable energy through 
policy dialogue. 
Private leverage achieved by different instruments varies 
depending on the definition and context
Public investments need to deliver extra financing from the 
private sector and environmental and social benefits from the 
project. Public actions, as summarized above in the form of 
technical assistance and capacity building, need to create an 
attractive investment environment. The effectiveness of such 
public actions in mobilizing additional finance cannot be easily 
measured but when it comes to determining the efficacy of 
alternative tools and mechanisms, assessing private finance 
mobilized can shed some light on where resources could be 
best allocated based on past performance (Table 2.3).
To measure the success of public financing interventions to 
‘crowd in’ private funding, lenders and public institutions can 
measure additional co-financing produced as a result of their 
investment by determining the ‘leverage ratio’. Methodologies to 
determine leverage differ and there is no one consistent 
definition available, often because the goal of what is being 
measured changes from organization to organization. Two 
critical methodological concerns arise from determining 
leverage:
1. the ‘additionality’ of financing: whether private investment 
would be deployed irrespective of the public finance support
2. co-financing: which sources of finance are used in the 
leverage calculation; for example, private sources only or 
further public sources
The OECD assessed 50 green investment projects and 
concluded that depending on the methodology deployed, 
leverage factors ranged from 1:0 (no leverage) to 1:78 (extremely 
high)81. Leverage factors varied widely depending on the 
technology, mechanism used and region of investment. Public 
funds often do not leverage private investments but come as a 
windfall profit, crowding out private funds, and high leverage 
does not necessarily equate to a large impact (such as 
emissions reduction or positive social gains). A stricter and more 
functional common definition and methodology for leverage of 
private investment is needed to measure the effectiveness of 
public interventions, and should take into account the benefits of 
private investment beyond the provision of capital (mitigation or 
adaptation benefits, for example).
More work is needed to understand the social and 
environmental benefits of deploying public finance, such as 
generating jobs or reducing greenhouse gas beyond mobilized 
private investment. High levels of finance mobilization do not 
necessarily mean high levels of environmental or social benefit.
Table 2.3: Range of leverage factors achieved by instrument
Sources: Climate Policy Initiative83, IFC84, Climate Investment Funds website85
Note: The methodologies used to calculate leverage of the different instruments shown differ, and 
therefore individual ratios should not be compared with one another.
Instrument/ 
mechanism
Leverage 
achieved
Methodology
Grants 1:8–1:10 UN High Level Advisory Group on 
Finance methodology (debt financed 
from grant funds)82
Clean Technology Fund 1:8 CTF investment: other sources of 
co-financing (private, MDBs, etc.)
Climate Investment 
Funds (for private-sector 
projects)
1:8.5 Climate Investment Fund spending: 
co-financing in private-sector 
investments
Global Environment 
Facility grants
Up to 1:7 GEF grant: all other co-financing (public 
and private)
Carbon finance (CERs) 1:3–1:4.5 CER revenue: total capital investmentx
Non-concessional 
lending
1:2–1:5 Public spending: private capital raised 
(UN High Level Advisory Group on 
Finance methodology)
Climate Investment 
Funds (public-sector 
projects)
1:3 Climate Investment Fund spending: 
co-financing in private-sector 
investments
Highly concessional 
lending
1:1–1:1.5 MDB lending: other sources of 
co-financing (public) (IFC)y
x Leverage ratios achieved under alternative methodologies have been shown to be higher but this 
figures is an adjusted average to include only mobilized funds that were not already earmarked for 
climate finance (Source: Is there a leverage paradox within climate finance? 2011. Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Climate Strategies).
y This is for International Development Association-type (public) loans, since highly concessional 
loans are rarely available to the private sector.
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Carbon finance, through the monetization of Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) and 
voluntary carbon offsets, has provided an important incentive for 
climate-change mitigation projects in both developed and 
developing countries. Since the Kyoto Protocol came into force 
in 2005, more than 4,500 Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects have been registered with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with a 
further 4,300 in the pipeline86.
At the end of 2011, US$ 28 billion worth of pre-2013 CERs had 
been contracted forward. If all underlying projects are 
implemented, these contracts will have supported additional 
investments of more than US$ 130 billion in developing 
countries87. Research from Climate Strategies88 suggests that 
the CDM mobilization ratio is in the range of 1:3–1:4.5 after 
adjusting the leverage definition to include only mobilized funds 
that were not already earmarked for climate finance.
Project-based markets have suffered as a result of the economic 
recession and the uncertainty around the future of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The total market value of CDM finance as an incentive 
has more than halved since its peak in 200789. Governments 
need to keep the momentum high by pushing for new binding 
reduction targets to drive continued climate-change mitigation 
investment in emerging economies.
A number of existing instruments and mechanisms 
demonstrate high mobilization of private funds through 
targeted public support
A review of project case studies, initiatives from members and 
partners of the Green Growth Action Alliance and the past 
performance of different mechanisms and instruments has 
demonstrated how different interventions can create attractive 
investment conditions for the private sector, and enable targeted 
public investment for green-growth projects. The following 
lessons for good practice have emerged:
Targeted government support is crucial to unlock commercial 
green finance
All case studies showed that initial support and backing from the 
public sector is an important prerequisite for mobilizing private 
funds. In the case of Metrobus in Mexico City, such support also 
included the presence of a champion/leader to advance policy 
and negotiate complex public-private partnerships. The lack of 
leadership in some projects resulted in delays. Dialogue with the 
private sector, stakeholder engagement and capacity building 
are all examples of government support that enabled the 
projects to develop.
Overarching policy support enabled most projects to attract 
private-sector involvement
Governments need to develop investment-grade national policy 
frameworks to create a supportive business environment that 
enables attractive returns for investors in green technologies. 
Not surprisingly, policy support via national legislation, such as 
for renewable energy targets and frameworks, emission-
reduction targets and subsidy programmes, has created new 
green markets and ensured projects’ commercial viability. The 
largest injections of private finance – for the Walney Offshore 
Windfarms in the UK, for example – would not have been 
provided if it were not for the incentive frameworks provided by 
the government through green tradable energy certificates. 
Public interventions can be successful when tailored to local 
requirements, involving end-users
The most innovative examples of public interventions, such as 
scrapping incentives for old bus fleets in Mexico city to remove 
competition to greener transport, and ‘on-lending’ through state 
utility companies by commercial banks to make it easier for 
customers to pay for energy efficiency measures in Tunisia, were 
tailored to local contexts to minimize risks and enable sustained 
private investment. With households already providing almost 
10% of overall climate-finance flows90, there appears to be 
significant potential to scale up private investment.
Early-stage funding and grants can mobilize private finance
In almost all cases, funding from public sources, such as the 
Global Environment Facility and Clean Technology Funds, to pay 
for initial research, feasibility studies, capacity building, policy 
design and technical assistance, was a core catalyst for further 
private-sector investment. Grant funding, when used effectively 
(for example, in Uruguay to develop Independent Power 
Producer legislation and national renewable energy targets), can 
pave the way to new green market creation and remove 
impediments that previously deterred private investors. 
Subsidies and grants can lead to high leverage of private funds, 
especially when combined with technical assistance; those 
given by EBRD’s lending programme for energy efficiency, for 
example. More needs to be done by governments to make clean 
investment funds such as the CTF more readily available and 
accessible. Carbon-offset financing (Box 2.4) can also play a 
more important role in the future, buffering risk for investors, as 
evidenced in projects such as Metrobus.
Investment capital can be de-risked through innovative models
The private sector will not scale up financing for green 
investments unless the risks of investing are no more 
pronounced than those for conventional investments. Case 
studies have shown that large private-sector investment has 
been successful in green projects when risks levels were 
reduced to acceptable, normal levels. De-risking tools, such as 
guarantees and insurance against policy, regulatory and 
macroeconomic risk, are underused and offer significant 
potential for mobilizing private investment. Work by the Green 
Growth Action Alliance in Kenya has shown promise in 
developing technological risk insurance for early-stage 
investment in geothermal technologies, while in India, partial 
credit guarantees have the potential to realize up to six times 
their investment in private-sector funding for solar power 
development. Innovative approaches have also emerged to 
promote commercial lending for green projects in developing 
and new markets, through support from governments and 
international financial institutions to underwrite loans. This is 
particularly beneficial in markets where a lack of familiarity with 
the technology in question and fears of debt default would 
otherwise make lenders less willing to release funds to scale up 
investment.
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Part 3: Catalysing Leadership 
and Private Investment
Green investment can be scaled up to deliver sustained 
global growth
This first Green Investment report synthesizes, crystallizes and 
draws out key implications and recommendations from the best 
available research on green investment from Alliance members 
and other leading institutions.  Based on current analysis on 
global green investment flows and the amounts needed to 
address climate and other environmental challenges, and given 
the growing base of experience in targeting public funds and 
policies to attract private investment in green growth, there are 
four recommendations for government, business and public 
finance leaders.
1. Greening investment, and thereby the economy, is the 
only option: carbon and resource-intensive growth is 
simply not a viable growth pathway
This first message is a broadcast to political, business, labour 
and civil society leaders and the general public. Economic 
growth cannot be sustained without dramatic increases in natural 
resource productivity and reductions in carbon emissions. As a 
result of the clear evidence of negative climate change impacts 
today, and the potentially devastating impacts in the future, 
greening investment is a pre-condition for a stable, vibrant and 
inclusive global economy. Building from the 2012 G20 Summit, 
G20 leaders should reaffirm that greening the economy is the 
only route to sustained growth and development.  
2. Transitioning to a green growth pathway is achievable at 
low cost 
Closing the gap between current investment flows and what is 
needed to achieve sustainable growth is completely achievable. 
The incremental costs of greening growth are insignificant 
compared with the costs of inaction, with fuel savings 
compensating in large part for the investment requirements. 
However, there are key barriers that must be overcome, from 
institutional inertia to first-mover disadvantages and a resistance 
to change. Political and business vision and leadership is needed 
to transform the business-as-usual investment pathway from 
traditional fossil-based infrastructure to low-carbon solutions. 
To accelerate and guide the green growth transformation, 
governments, investors and international organizations must 
improve global tracking, analysis and promotion of green 
investment. While considerable progress is being made through 
the individual and collective efforts of many institutions, there is a 
pressing need to extend data and methodologies to include the 
broader dimensions of green investment needs, including 
agriculture, water, and transportation infrastructure requirements. 
3. Effective policy pathways and the efficient deployment of 
public finance to green investment is well understood, tried 
and tested, and must now be scaled up
On public policies, whilst there is always more to learn, there is a 
broad consensus on what needs to be done. Part 2 of this report 
illustrates some of the many ways and means that can close the 
green investment gap. There is a need to reinforce the collective 
political will to advance public policies to incentivize green 
investment and economic growth, including:
 - accelerating the implementation of the G20 commitment to 
phase out fossil-fuel subsidies, and bringing into force fiscal 
and other instruments that establish robust carbon prices
 - enabling greater free trade in green technologies, including 
those developed with commercial and public finance, through 
initiatives such as those adopted by APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation) leaders
 - integrating the adaptation agenda into green investment by 
supporting initiatives that promote the scaled-up deployment 
of clean energy, water and agriculture across poorer 
communities, as exemplified by the United Nations 
Sustainable Energy for All Initiativez. 
On public finance, historically low interest rates and the need to 
kick-start the global economy are the perfect conditions for 
mobilizing and investing public finance in green infrastructure that 
will serve the needs of long-term, sustainable growth. There is 
sufficient experience in using financial instruments to enable 
public finance to be used to balance the mobilizing of private 
finance with public-sector risk-taking. To this end, G20 
governments and emerging economies can demonstrate 
leadership by:
 - encouraging development finance institutions to 
accelerate and rationalize the broad adoption and scale-
up of tried and tested public financing instruments, such as 
those that reduce investment risks for the private sector.  The 
International Development Finance Clubaa is well-positioned 
to lead this agenda.
 - engaging private investors directly in debate, co-design 
and wider dissemination of experience of relevant co-
financing mechanisms. More public-private collaboration is 
needed to explore how best to accelerate investment in green 
infrastructure; this can inform the design of the next 
generation of catalytic green funds, such as the Green 
Climate Fund being developed for the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
z See http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/ for more details.
aa See http://www.idfc.org/ for more details.
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4. Investors should seize the green investment opportunity 
by calibrating risk-return analysis to the current climate in 
pursuit of long-term returns 
Investors are increasingly looking to diversify their portfolios and 
exploring unconventional assets for returns. Throughout the 
investor community, infrastructure investment is attracting attention 
as a potential source of stable returns. Private investors do not 
need to wait for public policies or subsidies to remove all material 
risk. The rapid pace at which green solutions are developing is an 
ideal opportunity for investors to enter a growing market. With 
investor leadership—perhaps facilitated by the new Global Investor 
Coalition on Climate Changebb--there are a number of tried and 
tested public-private collaborations that can be expanded upon. 
Actions to be taken by private investors include:
 - enhancing financial analysis of green investment opportunities 
by building on the experience of first mover investors, 
factoring in more explicitly the risks of climate change and the 
potential for stranded, natural resource intensive assets.
 - making greater use of proven public-private financing 
mechanisms to de-risk investments.
 - Strengthening the appetite of developing country public 
finance agencies and investors in green investment 
opportunities, by adapting the financial and policy 
mechanisms outlined in this report.
The recommendations above will be advanced through the 
Green Growth Action Alliance, while the related initiatives outlined 
above and progress reports will be provided in future reports for 
the G20 and other stakeholders (see Box 3.1).
Box 3.1: The Green Growth Action Alliance: combining 
public and private expertise to scale up investment for 
green growth
The Green Growth Action Alliance is supporting the scale-up in 
green growth through the collaboration of more than 50 leading 
financial institutions, corporations, governments and non-
governmental organizations. By bringing together the 
knowledge of many different stakeholders, the Alliance aims to 
work with governments to help them adopt a systematic 
approach that rewards innovative green sectors through sound 
policies and improves their access to finance. Alliance members 
aim to achieve this by: collaborating to identify and deploy public 
money that can be used to unlock and utilize private-sector 
investment; identifying innovative financing and de-risking 
structures; supporting pilot testing of new models; and feeding 
results into international processes.
Some examples of initiatives and working groups trying to 
achieve these goals are given below.
Development and testing of new financing tools
In India, the Alliance worked with the Asian Development Bank, 
the Clinton Climate Initiative and the United Kingdom 
Government’s Capital Markets Climate Initiative to design and 
test public financing structures to mobilize private finance for 
India’s solar sector. This initiative resulted in the Renewable 
Energy Certificate Financing Facility designed to give private 
lenders confidence that debts can be repaid and to reduce the 
marginal cost of financing. The Alliance is also helping to unlock 
private financing for clean energy in Kenya by exploring 
bottlenecks to deploying private finance. Specific models being 
developed through this process include a bespoke insurance 
product for early-stage geothermal drilling risk, and a Policy Risk 
Insurance Mechanism for small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
Promotion of green free trade
Removing trade barriers will promote free trade in green goods 
and services, accelerate green technology deployment, spur 
competition, innovation and job creation, and reduce the cost of 
energy. Recent progress has been made by APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation) leaders, with tariff reductions for green 
goods and services currently being negotiated91. More progress 
is needed, however. By working pro-actively with governments 
and civil-society organizations, the Alliance is developing 
solutions, such as possible new green free-trade areas.  
Promotion of large-scale renewable-energy purchases by 
corporations
Corporations can boost confidence in renewable-energy 
projects by using their balance sheet, pooling funds or 
renewable-energy purchases and entering into long-term power-
purchase agreements directly with developers. The Alliance 
brings together corporate consumers, renewable-energy project 
developers and financiers to test and pilot end-user financing 
models in specific countries. 
Energy efficiency financing
The Alliance is advocating for new financing models that deliver 
energy efficiency. It is drawing on the experience of member 
organizations and collaborating with national governments and 
prominent international platforms to incubate new models to 
increase the availability of private finance and to help produce a 
vibrant market for delivering efficiency measures; for example, 
through new funds for energy-service companies in Mexico and 
Russia.
Climate-smart agriculture financing
The Alliance is developing replicable models that produce 
private financing for sustainable agriculture. The first pilot is 
being conducted in Vietnam and has identified specific 
interventions, including: developing a local investment fund to 
promote forest protection; using renewable energy to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural wastes; developing 
irrigation infrastructure for improved land management; and 
technical assistance to local banks to help them identify and 
lend to smallholders that follow good environmental practices.
Innovative finance models
The Alliance is helping to shine a light on successful green 
investment models with potential for scale through its 
partnership with the UNFCCC Secretariat’s Momentum for 
Change: Innovative Financing for Climate-friendly Investment 
initiative. The Alliance will note meritorious innovations, such as 
the models outlined in this report, and push for their recognition 
at future UNFCCC and World Economic Forum events so that 
they and other successful approaches might be replicatedcc.  
bb See website for further details: http://globalinvestorcoalition.org/
cc See Momentum for Change website for further details: 
http://unfccc.int/secretariat/momentum_for_change/items/6214.php
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Assumptions and Data 
Sources Used in the Investment Gap 
Analysis
The below table outlines the sectors addressed in Part 1 of this 
report, as well as:
 - the investment needs under a business-as-usual (BAU) and 
2°C scenario
 - any conversions and assumptions attached to the presented 
investment needs
 - scope of investment needs (e.g. sectors, and regions, if not 
global)
 - normalized values on a per-year basis between 2010 and 2030
 - data gaps where additional investment needs under a 2°C 
scenario are unknown
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Appendix 2: Case Studies
Innovative partnerships can be developed through targeted 
government support: the case of Mexico City’s Metrobus
Case study and data provided by the OECD97 
Overview
Mexico City’s Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system is a surface 
metro system consisting of four lines covering 93 km, 365 buses 
and a daily patronage of more than 700,000 passengers. It 
commenced in June 2005 and is still expanding. It has typical 
elements of a BRT system, including dedicated, confined bus 
lanes, enclosed stations, electronic fee payment prior to 
boarding, high-capacity buses and advanced control systems. It 
replaced an existing ineffective microbus network with higher 
social costs of safety and air quality. The Metrobus project 
succeeded despite an environment with multiple investment 
barriers, including a complicated concession scheme and lack 
of funding, and initially received little political support. 
Mobilizing private finance
Financing structure (US$ millions)
Achieved leverage
Lessons learned and scalable attributes
 - On-the-ground capacity support from a champion, non-
governmental organizations and civil society contribute to 
project successes.
 - Perverse incentives can be reversed through government 
action, shown here through a unique scrapping programme 
for ‘brown’ infrastructure and granting equity in the new 
system to existing concessionaires.
 - The lack of PPP law does not necessarily prohibit private-
sector investment. The lack of PPP law in Mexico at the time 
created innovative partnerships between government and 
private-sector operators through a Decentralized Public 
Organism (DPO) that manages the Metrobus network.
Strong public incentives are needed to make large projects 
viable: the case of Walney Offshore Windfarms, UK
Case study and data provided by the Climate Policy Initiative98 
Overview
The £1.3 billion (US$ 2.1 billion) Walney Offshore Windfarms 
(WOW) is a 367.2 megawatt offshore wind park in the United 
Kingdom developed by DONG Energy. At the time of 
commissioning in 2012, it was the largest offshore wind park in 
the world. At the time of its approval in 2007 DONG Energy 
faced a serious challenge in attracting sufficient investment. The 
offshore location added numerous risks to the project profile, 
including significant revenue, construction, operation, and 
maintenance risks. Typical providers of project finance – 
European banks – were reluctant to back such a large 
renewable energy project, especially given the escalating 
European debt crisis. The Walney project used a combination of 
policy and financial tools and incentives to successfully tackle 
barriers to renewable energy investment at this scale. 
Mobilizing private finance
Existing investment 
barriers
Underlying enabling 
factors
Successful policies and 
instruments used
 - Concession schemes 
and strong concession 
laws
 - Absence of public-
private partnership 
laws
 - Lack of revenues to 
cover large up-front 
costs
 - Highly centralized 
nature of transport 
planning
 - Strong lobbying from 
civil society and 
non-governmental 
organizations
 - Existing strong clean-air 
agenda
 - Presence of an effective 
champion
 - Scrapping programme 
for existing fleet
 - Unbundling 
infrastructure and fleet 
costs to attract more 
investors
 - International grants for 
early-stage planning
 - Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) 
financing
 - Payments for Services 
scheme for private 
investor-operators
 - Lack of public-private 
partnership (PPP) law 
forced the development 
of innovative 
partnerships
Existing investment 
barriers
Underlying enabling 
factors
Successful policies and 
instruments used
 - High capital costs and 
limited pool of 
experienced project 
developers
 - Banks reluctant to 
provide debt funding 
for offshore wind farms
 - Investors unwilling to 
take on project-level 
risks (construction, 
technology and price 
risks)
 - Uncertainty around 
project returns
 - Presence of a long-term 
emissions reduction 
target for the UK
 - Clear and long-term 
underlying policy 
framework of incentives
 - Tradable green energy 
certificates provided 
additional benefits and 
contributed towards 
future income (60% of 
total project revenues)
 - Successful de-risking 
through:
 - Power Purchase 
Agreements between 
the Walney Special 
Purpose Vehicle and 
its three shareholders
 - Construction 
management 
agreements
 - Operation and 
maintenance 
agreements
 - Lending facilities 
extended by DONG 
energy to investors: 
mezzanine and bridge 
financing
Public 
investment
Sources Private 
investment
Sources Total 
investment
Infrastructure
258 m (88%) Mexican Government 35 m (12%) Various 293 m
Fleet
15 m (15%) Mexican Government 84 m (85%) Various 99 m
Other funding
9 m CDM financing (over 
10 years)*
9 m
4.8 m World Bank GEF 
Grant
4.8 m
Total
287 m 119 m 406 m
Public : private leverage 
achieved
Methodology
1 : 0.42 Overall public : private ratio
1 : 19 CDM revenues : overall investment (Line 1 only)
1 : 82 World Bank GEF Grant : overall investment
Exchange rate used as of 22 October 2012 (12.88 MXN/USD)
* Assuming US$ 22/tonne in CDM revenue
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In addition to the £1.3 billion investment for WOW, revenue 
incentives through tradable green energy certificates worth 
another £1.3–1.5 billion (US$ 2.1-2.4 billion) over the lifetime of 
the project will be paid by regional energy suppliers through the 
United Kingdom Government’s Renewable Obligation Certificate 
scheme.
Lessons learned and scalable attributes
 - De-risking the equity stake can attract non-traditional 
investors by matching the equity features of the project to 
those of common fixed-income securities.
 - Attractive government policy incentives and the innovative use 
of incentives by project developers are essential to make the 
project viable to all stakeholders.
 - Innovative financial engineering can shield external investors 
from major risks of clean-energy investments.
Government subsidies can help push commercially 
unproven technologies into a more competitive market: the 
case of Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power Plant, 
Morocco
Case study and data provided by the Climate Policy Initiative99 
Overview
Ouarzazate I is a concentrated solar power (CSP) plant financed 
by the Clean Technology Fund, international finance institutions, 
the Government of Morocco and a consortium of private 
developers. The 160 megawatt Ouarzazate I Plant is the first 
phase of a 500 megawatt CSP facility in Morocco. It is the first 
project under the recent Morocco Solar Plan, which aims to 
install 2,000 megawatts of solar power capacity by 2020, 
including five CSP plants. The project will be developed via a 
public-private partnership by a special purpose vehicle, a 
consortium of private developers and the Moroccan Agency for 
Solar Energy (MASEN). The project is made possible by a 
substantial subsidy from the Government of Morocco in the form 
of a power purchase agreement above grid price covering the 
expected 25-year lifetime of the project. The Morocco 
Government and international finance institutions are betting on 
the project’s contribution to developing a CSP market in the 
region that will bring longer-term and broader economic 
benefits. Construction of the plant was scheduled to start before 
the end of 2012.
Financing structure (US$ millions) Mobilizing private finance
Achieved leverage
Lessons learned and scalable attributes
 - There is no low-cost first step for technology that is not yet 
commercially viable. Concessional loans and public grants 
are, therefore, a crucial required element of finance for 
technologies such as CSP. Public money should, however, 
help to drive down costs and maximize potential future public 
benefits. As technologies develop, the appropriate level of 
public subsidization needs to be revaluated. 
 - Strong public support and closely aligning public partners are 
a prerequisite for project success.
 - Public-private partnerships need to be carefully designed with 
a competitive tendering procedure to efficiently allocate risk.
Existing investment 
barriers
Underlying enabling 
factors
Successful policies and 
instruments used
 - High cost of CSP 
compared with 
alternative power 
sources
 - Size of investment 
required exceeds 
resources available 
from one single 
institution
 - Institutionally complex 
infrastructure 
investments with high 
transactional costs
 - Clear national policy 
framework and 
dedicated agency to 
drive projects forward
 - Significant involvement 
of international finance 
institutions
 - Close coordination and 
strong engagement of 
donors
 - Significant government 
subsidy to cover the 
difference between the 
grid price and actual 
cost of electricity 
production (i.e. 
incremental cost)
 - Power purchase 
agreements to shift 
revenue risk from private 
developer to the 
Morocco Government
 - Concessional loans and 
grants from multiple 
international finance 
institutions, including 
through the Clean 
Technology Fund, 
substantially reducing 
financing costs
 - Public-private 
partnership offering 75% 
equity stake to a private 
consortium
Public : private leverage 
achieved
Methodology
1 : 1.4 Government subsidy : All other leveraged money
1 : 15 International grants : All other leveraged money
Private investment Sources
50.1% DONG Energy Power
25.1% SSE Renewables
24.8% OPW HoldCo*
Total: £1.3 billion
* In 2010, the OPW joint venture, a dedicated special purpose vehicle jointly held by the Dutch 
pension fund PGGM and the Dutch private equity fund Ampère Equity Fund acquired a 24.8% 
share in WOW from DONG Energy.
Financing structure (US$ millions)
Public 
investment
Sources Private 
investment
Sources
1,192 m Government subsidy (covering 
incremental cost of electricity 
production)
253 m Equity from private 
investors (75% stake 
of public-private 
partnership) and 
public agency (25%)
998 m Concessional loans (IBRD, 
EIB, AFD, KfW/BMZ, AfDB)
197 m Clean Technology Fund loans 
(AfDB, IBRD)
182 m Grants (EC/NIF, KfW/BMU, 
GoM, MASEN)
Sub-total: 2,569 m Sub-total: 253 m
Total financing mobilized: 2,822 m
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Funds raised through taxing fossil fuels can be used to 
leverage additional finance: the case of energy efficiency 
programmes in Thailand
Case study and data provided by the World Resources 
Institute100 
Overview
The Government of Thailand established an Energy Conservation 
Promotion Fund (ECPF) in 1992 to raise funds for energy 
efficiency through a dedicated sales tax levied on petroleum 
products that was intended also to reduce demand for fossil fuels. 
The fund was established to provide loans, grants and subsidies 
to promote energy efficiency. A separately funded demand side 
management (DSM) plan was initiated by the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand supported by the World Bank 
and funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Australia 
and Japan. The plan exceeded its own targets and resulted in a 
peak-load reduction of more than 500 megawatts and cumulative 
annual energy savings of more than 3,000 gigawatt hours over 
seven years. In 2002 the Government set up a revolving fund that 
provided credit lines to banks for energy-efficiency project loans 
that was successful in strengthening financial-sector capacity and 
leveraging additional finance. Thailand’s energy-efficiency reforms 
have been largely government-driven and financed but with 
strong strategic support from international partners.
Mobilizing private finance
Financing structure (US$ millions)
Achieved leverage
Lessons learned and scalable attributes
 - International support through technical assistance and 
capacity building is maximized when the goals of government 
and international partners are aligned.
 - Early analysis work by non-governmental organizations 
highlighted the role of energy efficiency in meeting the 
country’s energy needs.
 - Taxes on fossil fuels raised significant funds, giving the 
Thailand Government a stronger hand when negotiating with 
international partners.
Carefully allocating risks can attract commercial lenders 
and private investors: the case of solar water heaters in 
Tunisia
Case study and data provided by the Climate Policy Initiative 
and the World Resources Institute101 
Overview
In 1996, an initial World Bank-funded project provided a 35% 
subsidy on the capital cost of solar water heaters (SWHs) and was 
successful in stimulating market growth while the funding lasted. 
The project was not sustainable, however, as other barriers 
remained. Tunisia’s ‘programme solaire’ (Prosol) was supported 
by UNEP and the Mediterranean Renewable Energy Programme 
with US$ 2.2 million from the Italian Government in 2005, 
comprising: US$ 1 million for a 20% subsidy on the capital costs 
of SWHs; US$ 1 million for a temporary interest rate subsidy; and 
US$ 0.2 million for pre-investment activities to address barriers in 
the SWH market. The project financing scheme involved providing 
loans by commercial banks to residential consumers through 
accredited system suppliers, which were repaid through 
customers’ electricity bills. The Société Tunisienne de l’Electricité 
et de Gaz (STEG) assumed default risks by acting as the debt 
repayment enforcer and guarantor of the loans, and passed these 
risks on to consumers by withholding services in the event of 
non-payment. In 2007 a second phase was initiated, with the 
financing mechanisms supported almost exclusively by Tunisian 
resources, more lending and a wider choice of credit lines to 
households. By 2010 annual deployment of SWH systems had 
increased fivefold since the start of the initiative. 
Mobilizing private finance
Existing investment 
barriers
Underlying enabling 
factors
Successful policies and 
instruments used
 - Lack of funding for 
energy-efficiency 
programmes
 - Unwillingness of banks 
to provide lending for 
energy-efficiency 
projects
 - Significant Government 
support and close 
coordination with the 
private sector
 - An energy-efficiency 
policy and institutional 
framework
 - Strong international 
strategic support 
aligned with government 
objectives
 - Funds raised by taxing 
fossil fuel-based 
products (raising about 
US$ 50m/year)
 - Lines of credit provided 
to commercial banks for 
energy-efficiency project 
lending
Existing investment 
barriers
Underlying enabling 
factors
Successful policies and 
instruments used
 - Significant subsidies 
on fossil fuels
 - Lack of available 
financing
 - Lack of consumer 
awareness and 
confidence in the 
technology 
 - Early laws to promote 
energy conservation 
and awareness 
(capacity building, 
promotional campaigns, 
etc.)
 - Careful allocation of 
risks among main actors
 - Affordability for 
households
 - Capital cost subsidy for 
SWH installed in the 
residential sector, 
eventually provided by 
the utility
 - Temporary interest-rate 
subsidies
 - Removing debt default 
risk from suppliers
Public 
investment
Sources Private 
investment
Sources
Demand side management plan*
31.6 m Government of Thailand 
(Electricity Generating 
Authority)
N/A
14.9 m Grants (GEF, 
Government of Australia)
Up to 25 m Loan from Japan Bank 
for International 
Cooperation
Revolving fund for credit lines
453 m Total credit lines to 
commercial banks as of 
2010
~450 m 
(estimated)
Leveraged finance from 
commercial banks as of 
2010
Total financing mobilized: ~975 m (estimated)
Public : private leverage 
achieved
Methodology
1: 1 Revolving fund credit lines : Financing provided by 
participating banks
*Note that not all funding allocated in the demand side management plan has been mobilized.
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Lessons learned and scalable attributes
 - Capacity-building activities targeting financial institutions 
create awareness for market potential and can be pivotal in 
engaging local commercial banks to unlock the local credit 
market. Banks, therefore, can become leading promoters of 
the sector.
 - Carefully allocating risks among the main actors can help 
attract banks and other private investors.
 - Commitment by the Tunisia Government to subsidize SWH 
investments, to cover the incremental cost of the technology, 
was crucial in enabling the sector to become competitive 
when markets are still distorted by fossil-fuel subsidies.
Limited technical assistance can be sufficient to establish 
an attractive green investment environment: the case of 
wind energy in Uruguay
Case study and data provided by UNDP and the Global 
Environment Facility102 
Overview
A joint project between UNEP and the Global Environment 
Facility was established between 2007 and 2012 in Uruguay, 
providing a US$ 1 million GEF grant for technical advisory 
support around policy de-risking measures to address multiple 
barriers in the energy market. The initiative was designed to 
support the development of a 5 megawatt demonstration wind 
project by 2012. The project has exceeded expectations, with 
40 megawatts of wind energy now installed. Based on the 
policies developed using the UNEP-GEF grant funding, a further 
880 megawatts of wind-energy contracts are in the pipeline, 
with a goal of 1 gigawatt to be online in the country by the end of 
2015 to provide approximately one-quarter of total national 
energy consumption. This is a major transition over a short time 
frame, made possible by rapidly establishing an enabling policy 
environment that has successfully inspired large financial flows 
to develop renewable energy. Targeted use of public funding 
was used to re-disk investments, enabling wind energy to be 
become a competitive market.
Mobilizing private finance
Achieved leverage
Achieved leverage
Lessons learned and scalable attributes
 - Technical support for policy de-risking can help significantly 
mobilize investment and create a renewable energy market.
 - The case of Uruguay shows that policy de-risking instruments 
alone can be sufficient to generate a renewable energy 
market; feed-in tariff incentives were not necessary.
 - Transferring technical knowledge to state utilities for 
procurement, ownership and to operate renewable energy 
facilities is critical for market scale-up.
 - Domestic policy frameworks are crucial to enable a renewable 
energy market to flourish. Including a national requirement/
target for renewable energy procurement gave the initial 
required push that created market momentum.
Existing investment 
barriers
Underlying enabling 
factors
Successful policies and 
instruments used
 - Lack of national policy 
framework for 
renewable energy
 - Lack of institutional 
knowledge within 
government
 - Low awareness of 
renewable energy 
potential in the country
 - Technological barriers 
(lack of infrastructure, 
equipment and 
expertise)
 - UNEP and GEF funding 
combined with technical 
advisory support
 - US$1 million GEF grant
 - Technical support to 
develop policy 
de-risking instruments
 - Technical support to 
develop a national policy 
framework for 
renewable energy 
(targets and IPP 
regulations, etc.)
 - Capacity building to 
raise awareness and 
provide technical 
training (for both the 
utility and the Uruguay 
Government)
Public : private leverage 
achieved
Methodology
1 : 2000 GEF grant : Estimated mobilized investment
1 : 285 Overall initial investment : Estimated mobilized 
investment
1 : 6 GEF grant : Other co-financing for the initiative
Public : private leverage 
achieved
Methodology
1 : 5 Overall public investment : private investment
Financing structure (US$ millions)
Public 
investment
Sources Private 
investment
Sources Total 
investment
1 m UNEP-GEF 
grants
2,000 m Mobilized 
investment to 
develop wind energy 
(various sources)
6 m Co-financing
7 m 2,000 m 2,000 m 
(estimated)
Financing structure (US$ millions)
Public 
investment
Sources Private 
investment
Sources Total 
investment
2.4 m Grant from 
Government of 
Italy
59.8 m Local commercial 
lenders (70% of 
SWH costs)
21.8 m Grant from 
Government of 
Tunisia
50.3 m Direct payments 
for the residual 
SWH investment 
cost and interest 
rates repayments 
by end-users
Total
24.2 m 110.2 m 134 m
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Public-private fund mechanisms can be self-generating: 
the case of watershed protection in Ecuador and Columbia
Case study and data provided by the World Water Council103 
Overview
The Nature Conservancy set up the Water Funds in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in 2000. The Water Funds body is 
an endowment trust that is used to compensate for 
environmental services, such as supplying clean freshwater and 
providing biodiversity benefits. Water users (such as 
municipalities, hydropower facilities and industrial users) pay into 
the funds in exchange for the product they receive, namely fresh, 
clean water. The funds pay for forest conservation along rivers, 
streams and lakes, to ensure safe drinking water is available to 
all users, rather than being paid directly to individual landowners 
as in a Payments of Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme. A 
public-private partnership with various stakeholders, including 
the water users, determines how the money is allocated to 
different conservation projects.
There are 13 Water Funds either operating or being developed in 
Ecuador and Columbia. Initial funding has been provided from 
various sources, including the Global Environment Facility, the 
FEMSA Foundation and the Inter-American Development Bank.
Mobilizing private finance
Financing structure (US$ millions)
Achieved leverage
Lessons learned and scalable attributes
 - Government backing is crucial to successfully establish 
public-private fund mechanisms.
 - Large water users often have adequate private sources of 
funding that can be used to pay for conservation projects that 
protect the ecosystem services they rely on.
 - Initial grant funding is crucial for project set-up and 
administration but private sources of investment can lead to 
eventual high leverage.
 - Water users need to commit to pay into the funds to secure 
the long-term viability of projects.
 - Projects work best when there are multiple water users and 
threats to water availability are high.
Existing investment 
barriers
Underlying enabling 
factors
Successful policies and 
instruments used
 - Lack of national policy 
framework for 
conservation and 
biodiversity protection
 - Lack of institutional 
knowledge within 
governments
 - Backing by government 
policy and national water 
management institutions
 - Commitments from 
suppliers and users of 
ecosystems services
 - Good research and 
information-gathering 
for baseline data and 
monitoring
 - GEF grant funding
 - Concessional finance 
from development 
banks
 - Payments from water 
users (including private 
sources) into the fund
Public 
investment
Sources Private 
investment
Sources
5 m GEF grant 150 m Expected mobilized 
investment into the 
funds from water users 
(various sources)
5 m FEMSA Foundation 
grant
20 m Inter-American 
Development Bank
30 m 150 m 170 m (estimated)
Public : private leverage 
achieved
Methodology
1 : 5 Initial mobilizing finance : Estimated mobilized 
investment from water users
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Global Green Growth Institute
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Overseas Development Institute
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Standard & Poor’s
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media/
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United Nations Environment Programme
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GreenEconomy/InformationMaterials/Publications/Publication/
tabid/4613/language/en-US/Default.aspx?ID=6156.
REDDy Set Grow: Private Sector Suggestions for International 
Climate Change Negotiators, 2011; http://www.unepfi.org/
fileadmin/documents/reddysetgrowII.pdf.
World Bank
Development and Climate Change: A Strategic Framework for the 
World Bank Group, Technical Report, 2008; http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/407863-1219339233881/
DCCSFTechnicalReport.pdf.
World Development Report (Chapter 6)
Generating the Funding Needed for Mitigation and Adaptation; 2010.
B. Types of public financing instruments and mechanisms
Bloomberg New Energy Finance
Crossing the Valley of Death: Solutions to the next generation of 
clean energy project financing gap, 2010; bnef.com/
WhitePapers/download/29.
Brookings Institution
The Green Climate Fund: Options for Mobilizing the Private 
Sector, 2011; http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/
papers/2011/0830_green_climate_fund_sierra/0830_green_
climate_fund_sierra.pdf.
Center for American Progress and the Global Climate Network
Leveraging Private Finance for Clean Energy, November 2010; http://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/11/pdf/gcn_memo.pdf
Investing in Clean Energy: How to maximize clean energy 
deployment from international climate investments, November 
2010; http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/11/pdf/
gcnreport_nov2010.pdf.
Climate Policy Initiative
Renewable Energy Financing and Climate Policy Effectiveness, 
2011; http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/12/Renewable-Energy-Financing-and-Climate-
Policy-Effectiveness-Working-Paper.pdf.
Deutsche Bank Group 
GET Fit Program: Global Energy Transfer Feed in Tariffs for 
Developing Countries, April 2010; http://www.dbcca.com/
dbcca/EN/_media/GET_FiT_Program.pdf.
GET FiT Plus: DE-Risking Clean Energy Business Models in a 
Developing Country Context, April 2011; http://www.dbcca.com/
dbcca/EN/_media/GET_FiT_Plus.
pdf?dbiquery=null%3AGET+FiT.
Frankfurt School – UNEP Collaborating Center for Climate and 
Sustainable Energy Finance
Case Study: The Thai Energy Efficiency Revolving Fund, 2012; 
http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/publications/
fs-unepthaieerffinal2012_0.pdf.
G20 / International Finance Corporation
Climate Finance: Engaging the Private Sector.  A background 
paper for Mobilizing Climate Finance, a report prepared at the 
request of G20 Finance Ministers; http://www1.ifc.org/wps/
wcm/connect/5d659a804b28afee9978f908d0338960/
ClimateFinance_G20Report.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
GCCC (Global Climate Change Consultancy) 
Engaging Private Sector Capital at Scale in Financing Low 
Carbon Infrastructure in Developing Countries, May 2010; http://
www.gtriplec.co.nz/assets/Uploads/papers/engaging_private_
sector_capital_at_scale_2010_11_15.pdf
The Green Investment Report 36
GIZ 
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Boost Private Investment in Developing Countries, 2011; http://
www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib-2011/giz2011-0233en-smart-
climate-finance.pdf.
Global Financial Mechanism Project (an initiative of WWF)
Global Financial Mechanism Project: Proposals for the Design 
and Operation of a UNFCCC to Support At-Scale Mitigation 
Developing Countries and Leverage Additional Public and 
Private Sources of Funding, June 2010; http://
climateregistryoption.org.
International Energy Agency
Joint Public-Private Approaches for Energy Efficiency Finance: 
Policies to Scale Up Private Sector Investment, 2012; http://
www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/finance-1.
pdf.
The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
Mobilizing the Private Sector: Quantity-Performance Instruments 
for Public Climate Funds, 2012; http://www.oxfordenergy.org/
wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Mobilizing-the-Private-
Sector.pdf.
San Giorgio Group
Case Studies on Ouarzazate I Concentrated Solar Power 
(Morocco), Prosol (Tunisia), and Walney Offshore Wind Farms 
(United Kingdom), 2012; http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/
publication/san-giorgio-group-case-studies/.
UNEP Risoe Center on Energy, Climate and Sustainable 
Development
Accessing International Financing for Climate Change Mitigation, 
2012; http://tech-action.org/Guidebooks/TNA_Guidebook_
MitigationFinancing.pdf.
United Nations
Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investment (Released 
Annually); http://sefi.unep.org/english/globaltrends2010.html.
Public Finance Mechanisms to mobilize private sector 
investment in climate change mitigation, 2008; http://www.sefi.
unep.org/fileadmin/media/sefi/docs/UNEP_Public_Finance_
Report.pdf.
Investing in a Climate for Change: Engaging the Finance Sector, 
2008; http://www.uneptie.org/energy/information/publications/
details.asp?id=WEB/0140/PA.
Private Financing of Renewable Energy – A Guide for Policy 
Makers, 2009; http://www.uneptie.org/energy/finance/pdf/
Finance_guide%20FINAL.pdf.
Publicly Backed Guarantees as a Policy Instrument to Back 
Clean Energy, 2010; http://www.uneptie.org/energy/finance/pdf/
guarantees_web.pdf.
United Nations Development Programme 
Blending Climate Finance through National Climate Funds, 2011; 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/
Environment%20and%20Energy/Climate%20Change/
Capacity%20Development/Blending_Climate_Finance_
Through_National_Climate_Funds.pdf.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Financing Global Climate Change Mitigation, 2010; http://www.
unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/se/pdfs/gee21/gee21_pub/
GEE21_GlobalClimateChangeMitigation_ESE37.pdf.
United Nations Environment Programme
Innovative Climate Finance: Examples from the UNEP Bilateral 
Finance Institutions Climate Change Working Group, 2011; 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_Innovative_climate_finance_
final.pdf.
United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Initiative
Financing renewable energy in developing countries: drivers and 
barriers for private finance in sub-Saharan Africa, 2012; http://
www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Financing_Renewable_
Energy_in_subSaharan_Africa.pdf.
World Bank 
Mobilizing Climate Finance, 2011; http://www.g20-g8.com/
g8-g20/root/bank_objects/G20_Climate_Finance_report.pdf.
World Resources Institute
Public Financing Instruments to Leverage Private Capital for 
Climate-Relevant Investment: Focus on Multilateral Agencies, 
2012; http://www.wri.org/publication/public-finance-
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Moving the Fulcrum: A Primer on Public Climate Financing 
Instruments Used to Leverage Private Capital, 2012; http://www.
wri.org/publication/moving-the-fulcrum.
C. Other contextual publications
Ceres and UN Foundation
Investor Summit on Climate Risk and Energy Solutions – Final 
Report, 2012; http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/2012-
investor-summit-on-climate-risk-energy-solutions-final-report/
view.
Climate Investment Funds
CIF from the Ground Up: Investing in our Green Future, 2011; 
http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/
climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/CIF_Annual_Report.pdf. 
Climate Policy Initiative 
Public Climate Finance: A Survey of Systems to Monitor and 
Evaluate Climate Finance Effectiveness, 2012; http://
climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
Public-Climate-Finance-Survey.pdf.
Improving the Effectiveness of Climate Finance: A Survey of 
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Global Landscape of Climate Finance, 2012; http://
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Effective Green Financing: What have we learned so far? 2012; 
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Conference on Trade and Development
World Investment Report: Investing in a Low Carbon Economy, 
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